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Abstract 
 
In the frame of the Stairway to Excellence project, country analysis was performed for the EU MS that joined the EU since 
2004, with the objective to assess and corroborate all the qualitative and quantitative data in drawing national/regional 
FP7 participation patterns, understand the push–pull factors for FP7/H2020 participation and the factors affecting the 
capacity to absorb cohesion policy funds. This report articulates analysis on selected aspects and country-tailored policy 
suggestions aiming to tackle the weaknesses identified in the analysis. 
 
The report complements the complex qualitative/ quantitative analysis performed by the IPTS/KfG/S2E team. In order to 
avoid duplication and cover all the elements required for a sound analysis, the report builds on analytical framework 
developed by IPTS. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Facilitation of Horizon 2020/ESIF synergies in Lithuania 
Ensuring synergies between Horizon 2020 and cohesion funding, the smart specialisation strategies are 
foreseen to have a key role to play in terms of capacity building and providing a stairway to excellence. They 
are expected to consider both upstream and downstream actions to and from Horizon 2020 as key actions 
for the CP funding. The key upstream actions for cohesion funding include - but are not strictly limited to - 
the investments in innovative solutions and research infrastructures and equipment, in particular those of 
European interest. This includes support for „”satellite infrastructures“” linked to the ESFRI-related research 
infrastructures (RI), national/regional research facilities and technology centres, competence centres and 
science parks, with a clear focus on enhancing applied research, through reinforced cooperation with industry 
to leverage private research and innovation (R&I) investment.  
Before 2015 there were no targeted national instruments facilitating synergies between Horizon 2020 and 
EU SF in Lithuania. The interviewed experts noted, that since Lithuanians are not active nor successful at FP7 
calls, there is a lack of pressure from the interest groups on the policy makers and so there is no strong 
impulse to create mechanisms facilitating synergies. However, a number of upstream and downstream 
actions indirectly contribute to the synergies between the national and international sources. For example, 
upstream interventions were supported, including smaller research partnering facilities of national 
importance upgrading into research excellence, the modernisation of research organisations RIs, 
improvement of research skills of students and researchers, including also their mobility visits which have 
contributed to both research excellence and integration into the international research networks. Targeted 
incentives aimed at facilitation of national participation in FP7/Horizon 2020 are also available, for example 
the compensation of application preparation and VAT costs, international partner search and information 
campaigns in firms and technology centres to stimulate and facilitate participation in Horizon 2020. As of 
2015, more targeted upstream actions are planned (mainly by the Ministry of Education and Science and the 
Research Council of Lithuania), including: 
 Co-financing from the national funds to Lithuanian applications selected by the Horizon 2020;  
 Funding for projects that were positively evaluated, shortlisted, but not funded under Horizon 2020;  
 Funding for parallel labs located in Lithuania and partnering countries. 
Factors limiting the synergies and participation in Horizon 2020 
A number of factors limit Lithuania’s participation in the FP7/Horizon 2020 projects and reducing the 
synergies between the ESIF and national policy instruments and Horizon 2020 as well as other international 
programmes. Among the key factors are weak links to the European networks and limited international 
visibility, limited number of strong private R&I performers and the overall level of absorptive capacities (“the 
regional innovation paradox”), availability of other more attractive (national) funding opportunities, and 
specific features of the FP7/Horizon2020 projects. For example, Horizon 2020 projects are less attractive for 
private enterprises because they are perceived as very risky (low success rate), having high administrative 
load and being very far away from the market.  
Moreover, specific weaknesses in the current R&I governance system contribute to the limited synergies 
between the national R&I instruments and FP7/Horizon 2020.  Among these weaknesses are:  
 Poor coordination at the implementation and strategic levels, rivalry between two key ministries;  
 Weak programme management capacities;  
 Fragmentation and failure to leverage different funds and create synergies;  
 Fragmentation and duplication of R&D infrastructures and institutions promoting research-business 
cooperation and supporting innovation;  
 Present governance mode, mirrored by process-oriented policy implementation vs partnership-based 
programme management;  
 Lack of targets and incentives for internationalisation, and lack of awareness and related capacities 
at the EU SF/ESIF intermediate bodies and implementing agencies level (e.g. a prevailing opinion at 
the Ministry of Economy is that facilitation of synergies will inevitably lead to duplicated funding). 
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Policy suggestions 
To better facilitate synergies between Horizon 2020 and cohesion funding, the remaining challenges are: 
 First, to reduce fragmentation and improve policy capacities, for example, by ensuring better links 
between the fragmented policy routes, granting attention and resources to effective programme 
management. 
 Second, the policy spotlight has to move from “hard” infrastructure development to absorptive capacity 
strengthening and acceleration of new ideas pipeline through the innovation support services. Also the 
policy mix has to acknowledge the different maturity of existing and potential innovators: need for 
diversified and tailor-made instruments. 
 Third, weaknesses in creating strong science-industry partnerships and facilitating science 
entrepreneurship need to be addressed, for example, by optimizing the current network of public R&D 
services and innovation promotion infrastructure. Also, in order to achieve economies of scale by using 
funding of various state institutions, it is advisable to have a balance of larger and small-scale projects 
and the combined use of policy instruments, especially when it comes to public private cooperation and 
further development of mature R&D based innovators (see Table 4 in Chapter 3). Larger projects usually 
involve several stakeholders, do not rely on a single source of funding, and have large budgets, longer 
period of implementation and a few groups of beneficiaries. While the potential innovators (e.g. 
companies in traditional industries looking for new business models) would benefit from “soft” 
innovation support and smaller experimentation projects, mature innovators (larger R&D based SMEs, 
e.g. biotech or laser tech companies) could immediately start with larger and more long term innovation 
projects combining various funding sources. 
 Fourth, there is a need for better streamlined targets, policies, incentives for internationalisation, for 
example, none of the smart specialisation priorities should include purely national agendas. There is a 
need for capacity building of the policy makers and staff of various ESIF managing authorities that are 
not aware on the possibilities/needs of creating the synergies between ESIF and Horizon 2020, remain 
reluctant and view the synergies as a risk for “duplication of funding”.  
 Fifth, creation of motivation and skills at the individual (researchers) level, by promoting science 
entrepreneurship, e.g. researchers’ contracts should be adjusted to provide time to work with business 
and Horizon 2020. A similar change should occur at institutional level (incl. IPR policies). 
 Sixth, weak integration in the European networks is a key challenge, which could be addressed by 
extending and strengthen measures like InnoConnect to fund various networks, increased attention to 
researchers mobility visits. 
 Finally, Horizon 2020 projects are less attractive for private enterprises because they are perceived as 
very risky due to low success rate, having high administrative load and being very far away from the 
market. To address this challenge there is a need to strengthen the national framework for proactive 
position of Lithuanian entities in project preparatory activities through dedicated project assistance and 
partner search grant scheme available for both public and private R&D (currently financial assistance is 
mainly available for PROs only). At the EU level the administration rules of Horizon 2020 need to be 
reviewed (e.g. the rule on accounting for the salaries and calculating the cost on man-days reduces the 
motivation to participate in those countries where salaries are lower1). 
 
 
                                                        
1
 More specifically, this comment refers to calculating hourly rates according to usual accounting practice based on actual personnel 
costs. First, actual personnel salaries at the public research organisations are very low - on average, several times lower compared to 
EU-15 (especially early career researchers, PhDs). Second, in many SMEs in Lithuania still employees get compensated (apart from their 
salary) using other sources with lower tax rates (for example, gifts, stipends, car fuel, etc.). As a result, many Lithuanian participants can 
only declare relatively low actual personnel costs. Staff involved in the FP7/Horizon 2020 projects have to perform the same complex 
R&D tasks as their colleagues from other (better paying) countries, whereas funding for personnel costs in these projects is several 
times lower. This reduces the motivation of both staff and institutions to participate, especially when early career researchers are 
involved. Also, it reduces possibilities to attract highly qualified researchers (competitive funding projects are often seen by organisations 
as an additional funding source for more/better human resources). The afore mentionned rule is different from, for example, the 
European Commission’s public procurement rules, which imply categories of experts (and fixed rates per category) that are equal to all 
experts despite their countries of origin, their actual salaries or average salaries at their institutions etc. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Background of Stairway to excellence project  
The European Commission Framework Programme (FP) for research and technology development has been 
vital in the development of European knowledge generation. However, there is considerable disparity across 
EU countries and regions in terms of FP participation and innovation performance. 
Horizon 2020 will continue to provide funding on the basis of excellence, regardless of geographical location. 
However, it will also introduce novel measures for "spreading excellence and widening participation" by 
targeting low Research & Innovation (R&I) performing countries - most of whom are eligible for innovation 
funding under Cohesion Policy for the period 2014-2020. 
In addition, the new regulations for ESIF aim to use funds more effectively to build regional/national 
excellence and capacities. By doing so, the key funding sources (ESIF and Horizon 2020) can complement one 
another along the entire innovation process. 
Objective of S2E 
The Stairway to Excellence (S2E) project is centred on the provision of support to enhance the value of the 
key European Union (EU) funding sources for research, development and innovation: European Structural and 
Investment Funds and Horizon 2020 but also the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises (COSME), Erasmus+, Creative Europe, European Union Programme for Employment and 
Social Innovation ("EaSI") and the digital services part of the Connecting Europe Facility by actively promoting 
their combination.  The project has two main objectives, namely: 
• Providing of assistance to regions and countries that  joined the EU since 2004 in closing the innovation 
gap, in order to promote excellence in all regions and EU countries; 
• Stimulating the early and effective implementation of national and regional Smart Specialisation 
Strategies. 
 
Main purpose of the document  
In the frame of the project, complex country analysis is performed for all 13 EU MS with the objective to 
assess and corroborate all the qualitative and quantitative data in drawing national/regional  FP7 
participation patterns, understand the push–pull factors for FP7 participation and the factors affecting the 
capacity to absorb cohesion policy funds. This report articulates analysis on selected aspects and country-
tailored policy suggestions aiming to tackle the weaknesses identified in the analysis.  
The report complements the complex qualitative/ quantitative analysis performed the IPTS/KfG/S2E team. In 
order to avoid duplication and cover all the elements required for a sound analysis, the report builds on 
analytical framework developed by IPTS.  
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2. QUALITY OF THE GOVERNANCE 
 
The governance system: status quo and recent changes 
An organogram below presents the relevant actors involved in the design of the ESIF instruments for R&I 
funding, the relevant managing authorities, funding/evaluation agencies, the institutional role of the regions, 
the inter-institutional relation and coordination, and key public R&I services providers. The Ministry of Finance 
(its EU Structural Assistance Management Department) is the Managing Authority of ESIF funds. The two 
interim authorities - Ministry of Economy (ŪM) and Ministry of Education and Science (ŠMM) - are the 
principal R&D and innovation policy forming institutions in Lithuania. ŪM is responsible for innovation policy, 
ŠMM is responsible for higher education and public R&D policy. Six agencies are responsible for administering 
ESIF funding of research and innovation (incl. general business access to finance):  
 CPVA (R&D infrastructure, four measures with €303m in total for 2007-2015);  
 LVPA (nine key ESIF measures for R&I in business with around €237m in 2007-2015); 
 ESFA (ESIF funds for training and education, researchers“ placements in companies, €116m in 2007-
2015 for the priority “Strengthening of researchers’ capacities”, €21m in 2013);  
 LMT (competitive funding for R&D in public research organisations and researchers mobility, €17m in 
2013);  
 MITA (innovation vouchers);  
 INVEGA (general access to finance, e.g. VC, micro-crediting and State guarantees).  
Both LMT and MITA are responsible for coordinating national participation in the international programmes. 
MITA coordinates Horizon 2020, Eureka, Eurostars and Bonus. LMT coordinates involvement into the joint 
programming initiatives. Until the reorganisation in 2009 the Lithuanian Research Council also served as an 
advisory board for the Lithuanian Parliament. The Strategic R&D and Innovation Council (2013) now has a 
mandate for the coordination of R&D and innovation policy at the highest political level. 
Figure 1. Organogram – governance of R&D funds (including structural funds for R&D)  
 
Source: prepared by the author based on Paliokaitė (2015). 
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In terms of legislative or regulatory actions such as laws, framework laws addressing research and 
innovation with the (articulated or indirect) objective to improve the environment for innovation, the Law on 
Research and Higher Education (2009) defines the terms R&D, science and technology parks, integrated 
science, studies and business centres („valleys“), R&D institutes, and regulates funding and governance of 
R&D. Since mid-2009, there have been considerable changes in the innovation governance system, especially 
the institutional set-up and strategic policy documents (see Table 1 below). The Lithuanian Innovation 
Strategy was adopted in 2010, extending the definition of innovation by including social, customer-oriented, 
non-technological, demand-oriented, and public innovation. The Strategy was upgraded in December 2013 
into the Lithuanian Innovation Promotion Programme 2014-2020. In April 2014 the Lithuanian Government 
approved the Programme on the Implementation of the R&I Priority Areas and Their Priorities, which provides 
the basic principles for implementing the smart specialisation priorities, such as the rules for selecting and 
approving the new priorities, monitoring and review procedures, key implementing bodies and their 
responsibilities. This Programme provides that specific implementation plans will be designed for each of the 
20 smart specialisation priorities.  
Table 1. Key R&I and EU SF/ESIF related strategies and programmes 
Date of 
approval 
Document 
2009 Law on Research and Studies. 
Concept of the Establishment and Development of Integrated Science, Studies and Business Centres (Valleys). 
2010 Lithuanian Innovation Strategy 2010-2020 (abolished in 2014). 
2012 Concept of the Establishment and Development of Integrated Science, Studies and Business Centres (Valleys) updated. 
National Development Strategy “Lithuania 2030”. 
National Development Programme 2014-2020. 
National R&D and Studies Programme for 2013-2020. 
2013 Regulation by the Government on Smart specialisation priority areas and their specific priorities. 
Lithuanian Innovation Promotion Programme 2014-2020. 
2014 SF Operational Programme for 2014-2020 approved by the EC in September. 
Programme on the Implementation of the R&I Priority Areas and Their Priorities. 
2015 Updated Law on Research and Studies (new version presented by ŠMM). Not yet approved by June 2015. 
New Law on Innovation Promotion (presented by ŪM). Not yet approved by June 2015. 
Implementation plans of 20 smart specialisation priorities.  
New sets of 2015-2020 policy measures planned by the ministries, but not yet approved by June 2015. 
Source: prepared by the author. 
 
Drawing on an argument that current Law on Research and Studies and the subsequent implementing 
bylaws, decrees and regulations apply a narrow and inaccurate definition of R&D activities (equated with 
“research” only), which impacts on the related policy measures and institutional as well as competitive R&D 
funding, in 2015 the Ministry of Economy initiated the Innovation Promotion Law and systemic review which 
should tackle the above-mentioned problems. The working group under the Lithuanian Government, 
consisting of the representatives of key ministries and interested parties, was formed in January 2015 to 
discuss the need for this new Law and the reform of the national innovation system. Among the discussed 
options is the restructuring of the existing institutional system. For example, the Ministry of Economy 
proposed creation of the Innovation Fund and Innovation Agency (merging the existing LVPA and MITA 
agencies), as well as clearly separating the functions of LMT and MITA. In 2015 the Ministry of Education and 
Science also presented an updated version of the Law on Research and Studies, which incorporates the 
definition of innovation.  
SWOT and remaining bottlenecks  
There is a number of weaknesses or barriers of the R&I system and policy governance, that may affect 
negatively the participation of the R&I performers in ESIF and H2020 calls. There is insufficient leverage of 
different funds as well as few synergies between ESIF 2007-2013 measures, or the synergies between ESIF 
and other national and international programmes. Bottlenecks remaining in the current governance system 
are discussed below. 
First, lack of coordination leads to huge fragmentation of policy instruments, programmes, 
institutions, infrastructures and monitoring systems. R&D policies have not been sufficiently 
coordinated at both highest political level and between the different policy implementing institutions. This 
results in overlapping measures and lack of effective attempts to create synergies between different 
measures e.g. valleys and clusters or enterprises and public research institutions projects. The valleys were 
build but limited effort to stimulate the activities in valleys or attract scientists to valleys has been made 
until 2015. 
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 Lack of coordination and rivalry between the key R&I policy making institutions. Among the 
reasons - different concepts of innovation (“science push” vs innovation systems and “demand steering”) 
and different administrative cultures fostered by the key ministries, which results in their constant 
rivalry and lack of trust. Existing coordination instruments (the Strategic R&D and Innovation Council 
under the Government) have not been effective in creating any consensus and ownership based 
solutions. Examples: 
a. Introduction of two competing laws regulating R&I (Law on Research and Studies, and Law on 
Innovation Promotion) in 2015, and both ministries are “blocking” the initiatives of one another. 
b. The Programme on the Implementation of the R&I Priority Areas and Their Priorities provides for 
the programming of ”joint initiatives” in implementing the priorities, i.e. programming a pipeline of 
several related R&D, education, infrastructure projects funded by several sources. The „joint 
initiatives” were proposed by the Ministry of Education and Science, but the idea was not supported 
by the Ministry of Economy. By the time when this Report was produced the Ministry of Finance 
was trying to moderate the discussion between key ministries. 
c. Trust issues led to a lack of agreement on a single agency responsible for monitoring of smart 
specialisation and hence the ministries appointed two institutions, each “their own” – ŠMM 
appointed MOSTA (for monitoring of public R&D instruments) and ŪM appointed themselves 
(monitoring business R&I instruments), see Figure 1. 
d. In the 2015-2020 both ministries may duplicate funding of new infrastructures (ŠMM will finance 
the construction of competence centres, ŪM – the technology centres), while similar uncoordinated 
actions in 2007-2014 already led to high fragmentation (open access centres and “valleys” vs 
science and technology parks and clusters). 
 There is fragmentation of functions at the national agencies’ level (LVPA, CPVA, MITA, LMT, and 
ESFA). The paradox is that the creation of MITA did not decrease the fragmentation as intended, but on 
the contrary – contributed to further fragmentation. Instead of merging the previously existing 
functions, MITA was established as yet another agency with a small role and partially overlapping 
functions. There is room for improvement in terms of coordination of the different objectives and calls 
of ESIF, national programmes or international programmes. MITA is responsible for the promotion of 
national participation in FP7/Horizon 2020, but it is an isolated function, not linked in any way with the 
programming or launch of the ESIF calls. 
 Various service-providing institutions, for example, MITA, Lithuanian Innovation Centre, 21 open 
access centres, 10 science and technology parks and their technology incubators, technology transfer 
centres, 45 clusters, business associations and so on, often play a similar role. All these institutions 
compete for limited State funding, making it impossible to provide professional services or attract 
qualified professionals. Furthermore, establishment of new types of institutions (centres of excellence, 
technology centres, competence centres, innovation centres, technology transfer centres and so on) is 
planned in 2015-2020, leading to further fragmentation.  
 Many instruments and programmes over 2007-2013 were not coordinated, despite continued efforts to 
do so. Therefore the complementarity of various instruments (e.g. the open access centres in the 
science “valleys”, industry clusters and direct support for R&D) is limited. There is lack of effective and 
systematic programme management skills and mechanisms. One example - "valleys" development, 
which essentially took place in an uncoordinated manner and depended on the universities’ interests 
and abilities.  
 Lack of coordination has led to parallel monitoring systems. For example, in the 2007-2015 period 
there existed an EU SF monitoring system and separate system for monitoring the results of science 
“valleys” and “complex R&D programmes” (although both instruments 100% funded by EU SF). Due to 
limited complementarity, accountability of the beneficiaries and lack of management capacities at the 
policy making/ implementing institutions, none of those costly systems are effective in accelerating 
change. 
Collaboration across all the relevant funding and development agencies and funding sources has to be 
ensured to facilitate streamlined, joined-up implementation of the smart specialisation priorities. In practice, 
it also means that there has to be a coordinating centre assigned with a responsibility to monitor 
synergies between the programmes and measures, to monitor calls for proposals, and review how successful 
are the different priorities in moving from stage to stage in the implementation process. Failure to create 
programme management capacities for the implementation of smart specialisation (i.e. a team/teams in one 
of the implementing bodies, preferably MITA) responsible for supervising the implementation of individual 
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priorities, encouraging cooperation, monitoring, project pipeline development and so on is likely to lead to 
same problems moving into a new period. 
Secondly, policy design and programme management capacities are weak, especially in the policy 
designing institutions (the ministries). There is a policy-specific “know how” in some of the implementing 
agencies and their capacities are relatively high. However they have limited impact on the policy decisions 
and funding rules. The system does not sufficiently integrate cutting-edge industrial expertise and knowhow, 
and it has developed a culture of risk-aversion, biased against early-stage and high risk innovation ventures, 
particularly in high-technology sectors. Staff of implementation agencies do not possess sufficient 
knowledge of the industry, and therefore they will remain limited in their capacity to fashion effective, 
output-oriented programs maximizing the impact of the funding distributed unless industry expertise is 
integrated in the instrument design and the selection phases. Also many beneficiaries complain that 
structural funds management process is too bureaucratic and process rather than results oriented (see 
Chapter 3). Furthermore, the implementing agencies lacks soft activities fostering innovation. They should 
focus more on project pipeline development, brokerage between business and public R&D institutions, 
consultancy for business in order to raise awareness of innovation benefits and increase motivation to 
practice innovation. The implementing agencies must raise the beneficiaries’ awareness that synergies are 
possible and effective to implement. Now there is fear of violating the rule of double funding and lack of 
awareness that it is possible to finance the same project from the different sources. 
Third, a critical issue is lack of strategic intelligence systems for policy learning and informing the 
decision making, including weak involvement of stakeholders in the process of designing R&I policy. 
Currently the respective capacities are relatively low and the functions are not embedded into the policy-
making cycle. As a result, policy-makers have very little understanding of how economies in principle diversify 
into new growth paths, and to what extent public policy may affect this process. Why, even if the problems 
and possible solutions are correctly identified, their successful implementation always fails – a „celebrated 
birth“ of another strategic council eventually turns into a "slow death", and the establishment of a new 
agency in no way diminishes the fragmentation of institutions, programmes and policy measures? One 
answer is – rushing the changes, ignoring the effective change management principles (future impact 
assessment, the search for consensus, the discussion and explanation of the foreseen benefits), and the 
creation of necessary capacities (in particular - human resources, monitoring, evaluation). In Lithuania, there 
is excessive focus on legal regulation, without paying attention to the explanation of the benefits of R&D, 
innovation and/or collaboration to the potential stakeholders (Visionary Analytics, 2014).  
Fourth, the capacity building to improve R&I performance was focused on public R&D 
infrastructure and acquisition of technology with limited investments into “soft” absorptive capacities. 
High proportion of capacity building investments into RI in the previous funding period can be considered as 
justified in the context where one of the main weaknesses of the Lithuanian R&D funding system has been 
the shortage of infrastructure investments over the last two decades. These investments however lacked 
measures fostering technological development, new product and service innovation and respective 
collaboration with public R&D resources. Also, the investment in human potential to work with the research 
infrastructures (RI) were not substantial enough. This can lead to a risk of not having enough human 
resources to work with the new infrastructure and equipment. The existing target group in Lithuania for the 
excellence-based competitive research measures is rather limited – consisting mainly of the limited number 
of top-tier research groups and few knowledge-based (spin-off) companies (see Chapter 3). Raising the 
allocations for direct R&D measures without simultaneously dealing with the pipeline creation through 
capacity building results in problems with absorption and stagnation in terms of participation in Horizon 
2020. More sophisticated approach to the capacity building is needed taking into account that the current 
capacity levels and the potentials to move up in the „stairway to excellence“ largely differ within the target 
group (Paliokaitė and Kubo, 2013; Paliokaitė and Martinaitis, 2014). Those with the R&I potential, but only 
modest or no R&I activity at present, would mostly benefit from „soft“ capacity building measures like 
innovation and technology audits, vouchers, clusters, foresights, brokerage and matchmaking, acceleration 
and mentoring, etc.  
Finally, from the governance perspective today’s practice reflects that FP activities (NCPs), cohesion 
funded and national programmes and transnational cooperation (under ETC and EUSBSR) 
activities are all rather separate streams of planning and actions . Transnational partnering has to be 
among the key national interests of small economies like Lithuania – when they shift to higher-value exports, 
they often lack the capital markets to rapidly develop innovation as well as the required skill sets. Success 
thus depends on early internationalisation of the science base and ability to reach the global value chains. 
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However, Lithuania does not have clear R&I internationalisation policy (although here and there exist 
fragmented targets that are discussed in Chapter 4), and the public R&D system can be characterised as 
rather closed with limited institutional incentives and targets for internationalisation. The 2007-2013 EU SF 
policy mix did not have internationalisation related measures (except for researchers mobility), and the 
country did not consult/benchmark with other countries when making its investments, which resulted in some 
unjustified decisions. The Lithuanian authorities have indicated specific measures for integration into 
European research infrastructures (especially ESFRI) in the current version of the OP for 2014-2020, but the 
international consultation and benchmarking activities were yet again very limited. 
To sum up, the main factors restricting synergies both between the EU SF itself and between EU SF and 
Horizon 2020 are lack of programme management and coordination capacities at all levels (highest political, 
programming, implementing agencies, as well as institutional). This requires first of all the coordination and 
consensus between two ministries responsible for R&I policy. Another issue is that internationalisation (incl. 
Horizon 2020) is not considered a key issue on the policy agenda. 
Table 2. SWOT  
Strengths Weaknesses 
 R&D capacities (R&D infrastructures in new production 
technologies) substantially strengthened during 2007-2015. 
 Smart specialisation priorities approved. 
 Multiannual research and innovation agendas (roadmaps) and 
priorities’ implementation plans developed, which could serve as 
starting point of ensuring the synergies. 
 A number of new formal coordination instruments (Strategic R&D 
and Innovation Council, Smart Specialisation Coordination Group), 
although not yet effective. 
 A more comprehensive policy mix for 2015-2020, including 
support for international collaboration (InoConnect LT and ESFRI), 
see Chapter 4. 
 
 Poor coordination at the implementation and strategic levels. Rivalry 
between two key ministries. 
 Weak programme management capacities. Fragmentation and failure 
to leverage different funds and create synergies. 
 Fragmentation and duplication of R&D infrastructures and institutions 
promoting research-business cooperation and supporting innovation. 
 The present governance mode, mirrored by process-oriented policy 
implementation vs partnership-based programme management. 
 Limited “soft” absorptive capacities building. Lithuanian R&I policy 
mix mainly targeted existing R&I performers, thus leaving the vast 
bulk of existing economy players and possible newcomers out of the 
scope.  
 Fragmented investments (lack of focus and priorities). 
 Limited investments into R&D human resources as compared to 
R&D infrastructures. 
 Transnational cooperation and looking for synergies with FPs etc. 
has rather stayed outside of national policy efforts. Limited 
incentives and targets for internationalisation.   
 The priority implementation roadmaps lack internationalisation 
agendas. 
 Lack of strategic intelligence (monitoring, evaluation, foresight) 
capacities. 
Opportunities Threats 
 Systemic review and reducing fragmentation (merging and closing 
ineffective institutions). 
 Orchestration of policies affecting R&I performance and better 
streamlining of ESIF funds could lead to economy transformation 
towards higher value added. 
 Using ESIF funds as financial incentive for optimisation of R&D 
infrastructures and their commercialisation and internationalisation 
agendas. 
 Different strategies (two tier process) targeting new, potential and 
mature innovators (Table 4, Chapter 3). 
 There is scope for more intensive and better coordinated 
transnational collaboration in developing the research 
infrastructures, especially within the Baltic Sea Region. Coordinated 
integration of the strongest Lithuanian RIs into the European 
networks of RIs, and stimulating connections of all the constructed 
RIs with related RIs in other regions. 
 Further fragmentation and duplication of efforts at national and 
international scale, if existing coordination problems not solved, will 
lead to limited impact of ESIF and national funds for R&I. 
 Limited absorption and low quality projects if soft capacity building 
will not be streamlined. 
 “Stewing in own juices”, if pressure and targets for 
internationalization not strengthened. 
 Lithuania’s transition to national funds in the post-2020 period will 
increase pressure on innovation policy effectiveness. If programme 
management capacities and thematic capacities are not created at 
the agencies before 2020, the existing system based on "smooth 
administration of EU funds" will become irrelevant, and the system 
will collapse. 
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3. FACTORS THAT SUPPORT OR LIMIT NATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN R&D 
CALLS FUNDED BY SF/ESIF  
 
Motivation to participate and factors supporting participation in ESIF 
Interviews with project participants allowed to summarize key motivations of companies and public research 
institutions to participate in SF/ESIF (see Table 5 below). The key motivation is capacity development - 
according to most interviewees, companies are interested in covering the cost of human resources and new 
R&D infrastructure. Low salaries and poor access to academic databases, libraries and world class equipment 
have been the principal obstacles to the attractiveness of a research career in Lithuania. Lithuanian 
universities pay very low salaries to early career researchers (including PhD stipends), constituting about 20% 
of early career researchers’ salaries in some other EU Member States. Only 30% of researchers are satisfied 
with their salaries (Idea Consult, 2013). There is a significant gap between remuneration levels in the public 
and the private business sector, as remuneration of researchers working in the higher education sector was 
43% lower than that of those working in the business sector. 
Factors that limit ESIF absorption in research and innovation 
Data on the absorption of SF funds are presented in Annex 3. Overall, the balance between direct funding for 
research activities and innovation activities (including R&D for innovative products development) over 2007-
2013 was not productive in terms of focus on innovative output, commercialization and growth.  First, the set 
of enterprise policies reinforced a general systemic tendency to favour technology absorption through capital 
investment over innovation. Second, policies targeting specifically R&I favoured investments into public 
research infrastructure and centres of competence versus commercialization of public research (e.g. through 
spin-offs), science-business collaboration and professional technology transfer services, or even direct 
funding for business R&I activities. This has tended to reinforce the existing trend of low investment in R&D 
and innovation by business sector and „passive“ adoption of technologies developed elsewhere.  Third, the 
measures related to direct R&I funding in business (Intellect LT, Idea LT) also faced relatively lower demand, 
compared to other measures aimed at SME“s growth (e.g. Leader LT that funded technology upgrading). 
Limited attractiveness of the SF/ESIFs in the domain of R&I can be explained by several factors discussed 
below: 
a. Current structure of the Lithuanian economy based on low value added, thus limited absorptive 
capacity for research projects and high demand for capacity building (incl. technology upgrading). 
b. Design of policy instruments neglecting the role of “soft” innovation support measures and pipeline 
building. 
c. The effect of economic crisis and competition between the measures (companies chose the most 
relevant for surviving and focused on short term). 
d. Extremely bureaucratic, inflexible and process rather than results based “administration of funds”. 
 
First of all, a low innovation capacity of the majority of businesses is hampering the absorption of 
respective public support measures. The “regional innovation paradox”, clearly visible in Lithuania, refers to 
the apparent contradiction between the comparatively greater need to spend on innovation in lagging regions 
and their relatively lower capacity to absorb public funds earmarked for the promotion of innovation and to 
invest in innovation related activities, compared to more advanced regions (Oughton et al., 2002). Lithuania 
does not have a strong track record of innovation, and the private sector, in its current “specialisation”, does 
not perceive innovation as critical factor to long-term competitiveness. As shown below, export and 
competitiveness in Lithuania are highly dependent on relatively large traditional sectors, which come under 
the titles „current locomotives“ and „sectors in transition“ in the overview. For the time being, the majority of 
enterprises in these sectors are consumers rather than creators of innovation. The analysis of the economy 
structure and knowledge has revealed that (see Figure 2), first, sectors described as „”natural priorities“” and 
“„rising/niche sectors“” tend to earmark the largest amounts of R&I investments and tend to create and adopt 
innovations most actively. These sectors can also be characterised as potential creators of future innovations. 
Most of them are relatively small (in terms of both value added and employment). 
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Figure 2. The map of economy competitiveness 
 
Source: Martinaitis et al. (2013) 
Moreover, most of R&D intensive companies in Lithuania lack critical mass – 55% of business R&D 
investments are made by companies having less than 250 employees, while only 21.77% of investments are 
made by companies having above 500 employees. This means that the key Lithuanian producers (large 
companies) generally do not invest into R&D and innovation, and those companies that invest have very 
limited capacities. 
Table 3. Business investments into R&D, according to company size, €m  
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 %, 2012 
500 employees and more 25,342 17,696 21,751 20,853 25,66 10,774 21,77 
249-500 employees 3,36 13,757 5,908 5,937 7,183 11,498 23,23 
250 and more 28,702 31,453 27,659 26,790 32,843 22,272 45,00 
50-249 16,711 9,644 9,702 11,208 9,5 9,529 19,25 
10-49 6,053 6,285 2,78 6,603 11,324 16,161 
35,75 
1-9 0,463 0,348 2,433 3,447 1,535 1,535 
Total, €m 51,929 47,729 42,574 48,048 55,202 49,496 100,00 
Source: Eurostat [09-03-2015] 
Considering that the majority of Lithuanian companies don’t have R&D activities and respective capacity, 
there is indeed more demand for (production) technology upgrading measures helping them to increase 
efficiency in the context of decreasing labour-cost competitiveness and postpone the need to move up in the 
value chain (which assumes R&D and innovation) for a while.  
Second, EU SF did not invest into „new“ and „potential“ innovators“ capacities and pipeline 
building. For Lithuania capacity building is an important way to improve its R&I performance in terms of 
excellence. The “regional innovation paradox”, clearly visible in Lithuania, refers to the apparent contradiction 
between the comparatively greater need to spend on innovation in lagging regions and their relatively lower 
capacity to absorb public funds earmarked for the promotion of innovation and to invest in innovation related 
activities, compared to more advanced regions (Oughton et al, 2002). The existing target group in Lithuania 
for the excellence-based competitive R&D measures is rather limited – consisting mainly of the limited 
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number of top-tier research groups and few knowledge-based (spin-off) companies. Raising the allocations 
for direct R&D measures without simultaneously dealing with the pipeline creation through capacity building 
might result in problems with absorption of available funding. Given the current innovators structure, SF 
policies should have focused on capacity strengthening and acceleration of new ideas pipeline through the 
innovation support services, seeking to encourage more “potential” and “new” innovators to invest into the 
development of new business fields, business models and products.  One of the reasons why companies in 
traditional industries are less engaged in R&D activities and partnership with universities and research 
institutes is their lack of competences related to the acknowledgement of the value of innovation and/or 
capabilities related to the management of innovation process. This failure justifies the additionality of State ’s 
intervention and the need for innovative ideas facilitation and acceleration services. However, in Lithuania 
2007-2013 investments into innovative capacities and project pipeline building constituted a marginal share 
of R&I investments (7.7%, see table 3.2 in Annex 3). Moreover, a large bulk of SF dedicated for „innovation 
services“ (Innogeb LT group of measures) focused on infrastructure of incubators and S&T parks, but not on 
innovative services, and the funds of these measures dried out around 2011-2012.   
Table 4. “Competence stairway” and the different needs of existing and potential innovators 
Type Technology consumers Potential innovators Emerging / new innovators Mature innovators 
Type of 
companies  
Manufacturing 
companies and services 
providers (including 
public sector) that lack 
modern technological 
and managerial capacity 
and productivity. 
 
Generally large(r) manufacturing 
companies or services providers in 
the traditional sectors („the 
cornerstones of economy”) facing the 
loss of competitiveness and thus 
feeling the pressure to move to new 
business fields and products. 
Generally young and small 
(below 100 employees) 
companies, export oriented, fast 
growing.  
The priorities where R&I potential 
is largely concentrated in the 
public science base are also in this 
group, with their strategies to be 
oriented towards economic results 
via spin-off creation. 
Generally R&D-based large 
(above 100 employees), long 
time in the market (10 years and 
above), operating in the high 
technology sectors, export 
oriented, having well developed 
networks with the research 
institutions and business 
partners in Lithuania and 
beyond.  
Challenges Modernisation and 
strengthening of 
technology and absorptive 
capacities (including the 
human resources). 
 
Diversification and technology transfer, 
new innovative activities and new 
business models. 
 
Acceleration of innovative 
activities, including spin-off 
creation, attraction of risk capital 
and other financial resources (incl. 
FDI) to increase the critical mass, 
strengthening of capacities. 
Moving to higher impact 
innovations, large scale R&D 
projects, new international 
markets, spin-outs. 
 
Needs  Demand-side incentives 
(innovative public 
procurement, pre-
commercial 
procurement, other 
market incentives). 
Capacity development 
(attracting highly 
qualified specialists, 
learning, technology 
upgrading, networking 
etc.) 
Incentives for transformation 
(platforms, clusters, foresight), 
support for experimentation and 
various innovation support services 
encouraging moving to new products 
and new business models, such as 
“soft”  idea development support, 
brokerage, technology services, R&D 
subcontracts fostering linkages with 
research institutions and technology 
transfer. 
Start-up acceleration (mentors, 
seed and risk capital), FDI 
attraction, R&D infrastructure 
and various “hard” and “soft” 
innovation support services, 
including vouchers for 
technology oriented services at 
the science parks and similar 
(prototype development, 
validation and pilot 
manufacturing). 
Large joint R&D projects, 
Horizon 2020 and other 
international initiatives, export 
support. R&D infrastructure 
support – only if moving to 
new business activities 
(completely new innovations). 
Promotion of technology 
diffusion and transfer from 
high tech to low tech 
industries (clusters, 
networking). 
Horizontal pre-
conditions and 
related policy 
interventions 
Ensuring availability of high quality specialists (including upgrading higher education programmes). 
Clusterisation and networking promotion (open innovation platforms). 
Support for experimentation and foresight. 
Favourable framework conditions (entrepreneurship policies, flexible labour market, tax policy, R&I regulations, talent attraction policies, 
standardisation, favourable conditions for research careers, etc.) 
 
Source: Paliokaitė, Martinaitis (2014) 
 
The 2007-2013 policy mix in Lithuania was mainly designed for existing R&I performers (“„mature 
innovators“), with very limited focus on the creation and growth of new knowledge intensive firms („emerging 
innovators“), or encouraging the „potential innovators“ in the traditional industries to move up the added 
value ladder. Although supporting the „champions“ can be a viable strategy, but it cannot be the only strategy 
in a country with a very limited number of „champions“. More tailor-made approach to the R&I capacity 
building is needed taking into account that the current capacity levels and the potential to move up in the 
„stairway“ largely differs within the target group. While today’s R&D performers would need the boost to 
THE COMPETENCE STAIRWAY 
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expand their R&I activities and engage into different collaborations and alliances, those with the R&I 
potential, but only modest or no R&I activity at present, would mostly benefit from „soft“ capacity building 
measures like innovation and technology audits, vouchers, clusters, foresights etc. FDI and spin-off creation 
are also viable routes. Policy mix thus could focus on providing incentives to encourage companies, 
entrepreneurs to become involved in the discovery of possible specialisations and opportunities for 
diversification therein (see Table above) (based on Paliokaitė, Kubo, 2013; Paliokaitė, Martinaitis, 2014). 
Third, the already limited capacities of Lithuanian companies were further limited by the economic 
crisis. The country’s economy experienced the European Union’s second-worst recession in 2009, when real 
GDP per capita fell by 14% compared to 2008 and stood almost 70% below the EU28 average (€6,900 per 
inhabitant). In 2009 the Lithuanian Government launched the €1.65 billion Economy Recovery Plan aimed at 
restoring market stability and providing greater access to capital for business in 2009-2011. This plan re-
allocated about €100 million from the Economy Growth OP Priority Axis I to venture capital funds (mainly the 
Controlling fund). Investments into technology absorption (both financial engineering instruments and grants 
for technology upgrading) helped the Lithuanian economy withstand the global financial and economic crisis 
in better shape than its regional peers (the anticyclical role) and had a positive effect on firm viability, even 
if for a short period. One of the reasons behind low take-up of funding for more selective policy instruments 
has been the simultaneous organisation of calls for proposals under different measures , which, in 
the opinion of the beneficiaries and experts, has led to competition between the measures. The already 
limited capacities of Lithuanian companies were further limited by the economic crisis. When the SF 
measures were launched at the very peak of the crisis (2008-2010), companies chose very carefully where 
to co-invest, given also the high administrative load of the SF projects. Some of the competing financing 
instruments were not used at the appropriate stages of the innovation process, e.g. technology absorption 
was funded via grants, not revolving instruments. The existing portfolio of measures for firms created 
competition for administrative funds – businesses chose the „easier“ and more popular measures for 
technological upgrading (e.g. Leader LT where the demand was very high) versus R&D measures like Idea LT 
and Intellect LT. Therefore, the absorption of the funds of the latter measures was lower than of other 
measures for firms on average. The managing authorities have already taken this into account – during 
2015-2020 in cases involving less risk — such as technology absorption — matching grants will be replaced 
by loans or other revolving instruments, since market failure related to credit constraints may not be as much 
of a threat. 
Finally, the efficacy of public support and the absorptive capacities were reduced by the formal, 
technical and „desk-top“ selection and administration procedures. Implementation agencies in 
Lithuania are somewhat reluctant to use public resources to finance high-risk innovation projects as it cannot 
be warranted that the R&D sponsored by the state will translate into commercially viable products. Therefore, 
there is a marked tendency in the system to finance low-risk technology projects, with tangible and 
guaranteed outcomes. Due to alleged concerns over potential corruption, officials from the implementation 
agencies (esp. LVPA) have to follow strict rules concerning the face-to-face interaction with applicants 
throughout the selection process (for example, at least two agency employees have to be present in a room 
where an interview with potential applicant is taking place). The „paper-based“ application procedure provides 
incentive for firms to hire consulting companies to draft grant applications that appeal to the reviewers but 
favour form over substance. Other issues: 
 Strict requirements that are unnecessary and do not add value to the project (for example, public 
procurement or the situation when the young enterprise has to search for partners with institutional 
experience just to satisfy the institutional requirements, while they could implement the project on 
their own); 
 Long lasting evaluation procedures - in some cases companies received funding for the project after 2 
years have passed since submitting the application. During this time the cost of equipment can 
increase, new ideas occur, some ideas can become irrelevant. 
 Very limited flexibility to address any changes in the project design. Companies were not allowed to 
change their procurement plans, for example buy different equipment or R&D trainings etc.  
 
The above-mentioned weaknesses create high administrative load for beneficiaries and reduce 
experimentation. Some interviewees noted that it is less costly to implement the R&D project with a 
company’s own means or a business loan than with the SF grant. Moreover, only those companies that are 
implementing large scale planned (hence, not new) projects, are encouraged to apply. Hence, public support 
may be replacing, rather than complementing, private expenditures on innovation and R&D. In the survey of 
beneficiaries, carried out in 2011, 69% of beneficiary firms that received support for R&I, concluded that 
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they would have implemented the funded projects even without the public support (although to a smaller 
extent or in a longer timeframe) (Paliokaitė et al. 2011).  
In summary, the current strategy has made very important investments into the public research capacity as 
well as firms’ technological upgrading and their research capacity. These investments were necessary 
considering the previous worn out state of the research base. However, this strategy has proven relatively 
weak in leveraging private sector investments into R&I and fostering public research commercialisation, 
mainly due to (1) investments into intermediary organisations instead of focusing on the entrepreneurial 
capabilities of research institutions and creating professional innovation services, (2) lack of „soft“ measures 
for entrepreneurial discovery and innovation capacities building in firms; (3) non-systemic innovation 
governance, characterised by limited synergies, networks, clusters and associations (see also Chapter 4); and 
(4) various small mis-steps in measures design e.g. launching all measures at once, subsidising technology 
absorption, etc.  
 
Table 5. Factors (motivations) supporting and limiting participation in R&I related ESIF 
 Companies PROs / universities 
Supporting 
factors / 
motivation 
 Covering the cost of R&I human resources. 
 Covering R&D infrastructure development 
costs. 
 Previous R&I experience and experience with 
SF/ESIF. 
 Availability of high quality consultancy services 
(most of companies hire a consultant to write 
an application). 
 Covering R&D infrastructure costs. 
 Possibility to raise the otherwise low researchers’ 
salaries. 
 Developing young generation of researchers. 
Limiting 
factors 
 Absorptive capacities - the majority of 
enterprises in these sectors are consumers 
rather than creators of innovation. 
 Investments into intermediary organisations 
instead of focusing on the entrepreneurial 
capabilities of research institutions and 
creating professional innovation services, lack 
of „soft“ measures for entrepreneurial 
discovery and innovation capacities building in 
firms 
 Non-systemic innovation governance, 
characterised by limited synergies, networks, 
clusters and associations. 
 Various small mis-steps in measures design 
e.g. launching all measures at once, subsidising 
technology absorption, etc. 
 Capacities limited by the economic crisis. 
 High administrative load of SF/ESIF projects, 
process oriented procedures and strict 
requirements (e.g. procurement), lack of 
flexibility. 
 Focus mainly on public R&D base. 
 High administrative load of SF/ESIF projects, process 
oriented and strict procedures (e.g. procurement), lack of 
flexibility. 
 Limited human resources and limited programme 
management (administrative) capacities. 
Source: compiled by author 
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4. PUSH – PULL FACTORS FOR R&I PERFORMERS TO PARTICIPATE IN 
FP7/H2020 
 
Overall, compared to other EU countries Lithuania participation in FP7 looks weak. Lithuania is 24th by 
number of participants who signed contracts and 26th by budget share of EC contribution. Compared with the 
Baltic States Lithuania outscores Latvia by intensity of finance and participants activity but not in the 
indicator of success rate. However Lithuania is behind Estonia for all indicators. The majority of Lithuanian 
participants in FP7 project are public R&D institutions (see Annex 4). 
Push factors 
Public research institutions and business enterprises share two sets of factors motivating them to participate 
in FP7/Horizon 2020 projects: 
 Financial support. Firstly, additional financing from the EC (next to the national and private funding) 
enables to implement difficult and expensive projects which require a lot of resources and which could 
not be implemented without additional support and sharing the risk. Secondly, FP7 and Horizon 2020 
projects are an additional source of organizational funding allowing to retain good quality staff. For 
example, during the economic crisis public research institutions received less R&D sub-contracts from 
the Lithuanian companies. FP7 projects became another opportunity to compensate the loss of R&D 
funding from business.  
 Scientific interest. FP7/Horizon 2020 projects allow to participate in large and interesting projects 
with partners from other countries. Participation in projects also enables to increase competence and 
build experience. Scientific interest plays an important role because both public research institutions and 
business enterprises do not apply for the projects which are not in their interest sphere. 
Public research institutions respond to additional push factors that motivate them to participate in 
FP7/Horizon 2020. 
 Institutional funding for PROs. The Government decision (adopted in 2009 and subsequently 
amended in 2010 and 2012) on the method for allocation of budgetary appropriations for R&D for 
public higher education and research institutions stipulated that higher share of institutional funding 
should be linked to research performance. The Decision established that 50% in 2011 and subsequent 
years of institutional funding will be allocated to public HEIs and research institutions on the basis of 
results of assessment of R&D activities. The remaining 50% as of 2011 are allocated on the basis of 
“normative number of staff” that is approved for each institution by the decree of Minister of Education 
and Research. The ministerial decree adopted in November 2012 stipulates that one of four criteria on 
which the assessment of R&D activities is funding received from participation in international research 
projects (see Table 6 below). 
 
Table 6. Institutional funding formula per field of science (international projects) 
 
Humanities 
Social 
sciences 
Natural 
sciences 
Biomedical 
sciences 
Agricultural 
sciences 
Technology 
sciences 
Share of “competitive half” of institutional 
funding calculated according to funding 
received from participation in international 
research projects 
5% 10% 15% 15% 15% 20% 
Source: Government’s Regulation No. 597 of 17-06-2009 on the Procedures for allocating State budget 
funds for research and (social, cultural) development and artistic activities of public education and research 
institutions. Latest amended version valid as of June 2014. 
 
 Ambition to become an internationally acclaimed and appreciated institution (the prestige 
factor). Successful participation in FP7/Horizon 2020 allows the institution to become more 
internationally recognized.  International recognition enables, for example, to attract researchers and 
interns from all over the world. For this reason increasingly the strategic focus of the largest universities 
in Lithuania is on the international projects, including FP7 and Horizon 2020. 
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Next to the above mentioned push factors, it must be noted that the new strategic Lithuanian documents 
(the OP for 2014-2020, the National Progress Programme for 2014-2020, the Science and Research 
Programme for 2013-2020) have set specific targets related to internationalisation of R&D. By 2020 it is 
expected that PROs’ revenues from participation in the international programmes will be €7.45m (it was €6m 
in 2011) and that Lithuania will be the member of four international research infrastructures (Lithuania was 
not a member of any international research infrastructures in 2012). Accordingly, a set of specific measures 
focus on facilitation of national participation in FP7/Horizon 2020 (see next Chapter). 
To conclude, main factors that motivate to participate in FP7/Horizon 2020 are: scientific interest, opportunity 
to receive additional financial support, and ambition to become internationally recognized and high level 
institution. 
Pull factors 
As noted in the beginning of this chapter public research institutions participate in FP7 projects more actively. 
Lithuanian organisations are much less active in FP7/Horizon 2020 projects because of these key factors: 
 Lack of individual motivation and skills. The career system of Lithuanian researchers does not 
sufficiently support orientation towards results or international projects (researchers are mostly 
evaluated for papers and teaching hours). Also, most scientists have too much administrative work and 
high teaching loads. As they are not motivated by universities in any way to participate in the 
FPs/Horizon 2020, many good opportunities are missed, unless there are motivated students who can 
drive projects as part of their learning process. Often there is a lack of administrative personnel who 
could manage administrative load created by the FP/SF/ESIF projects.  
 Lack of organisational motivation due to the rules of calculating personnel costs. More 
specifically, this comment refers to calculating hourly rates according to usual accounting practice 
based on actual personnel costs. First, actual personnel salaries at the public research organisations 
(especially early career researchers, PhDs) are very low - on average, several times lower compared to 
EU-15. Second, many SMEs in Lithuania still use „double accounting“, when formal salaries of their 
employees are very low, but employees get compensated using other sources with lower tax rates (for 
example, gifts, stipends, car fuel, etc.). As a result, many Lithuanian participants can only declare very 
low actual personnel costs. Their staff involved in the FP7/Horizon 2020 projects have to perform the 
same complex R&D tax as their colleagues from other (better paying) countries, but the funding for 
personnel costs in these projects is several times lower. This reduces the motivation of both staff and 
institutions to participate, especially when early career researchers are involved. Also, it reduces 
possibilities to attract highly qualified researchers (competitive funding projects are often seen by 
organisations as an additional funding source for more/better human resources).2 The above-described 
rule is different from, for example, the rules applied by European Commission’s public procurement 
rules, which imply categories of experts (and fixed rates per category) that are equal to all experts 
despite their countries of origin, their actual salaries or average salaries at their institutions etc. 
 Most of FP projects are long-term projects. This makes them harder to administrate. Business 
product developers are not interested to participate in FP projects, as they perceive them as too 
bureaucratic (Eriksonas et al., 2011). For example, interview respondents calculate that 
“commercialization in FP7/Horizon 2020 projects can be done only after 5 and more years after the 
project proposal submission3”. Time span for investment in R&D project of Lithuanian companies when 
they might agree to share the risk is not more than 2-3 years (Eriksonas et al., 2011). Also, sometimes 
it is difficult see all the challenges in advance. Sometimes when the partners are less flexible to adapt 
to the changing situations, participants may need to change partners during projects. To sum up, 
companies often prefer to implement their projects without partners and with fewer own funds, because 
it is a much quicker way to get the result. 
 High competition and specific restrictions. Especially private companies acknowledge that the 
success rate is several times lower than any other funding opportunity (e.g. the average success rate is 
about 20% in FP7 compared to up to 50% in the national R&D measures). The competition is lower in 
the national policy instruments, so many participants choose them instead of FP7/Horizon2020.  
                                                        
2 Source: two interviews with the PRO representatives/experts.  
3 NB: it is not a legal limitation, rather a dominant perception that “evaluation of FP7/Horizon 2020 projects takes very long and projects 
themselves take much longer than it would take if a company implements an internal project”. To overcome this barrier, better 
awareness raising and dissemination of good practices (related to SMEs’ projects leading to commercialisation of products) is advised. 
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 Weak links with European networks. Lithuania is a small country and Lithuanian companies are not 
well-known in Europe. This creates a difficulty in finding consortium partners. Most of the already 
formed consortia are not willing to open up to new partners. The main link between the FP/Horizon2020 
(incl. KETs) research agenda and the national research agendas is provided by the EU technology 
platforms and European clusters and (through their mirror groups) by the national clusters and 
technology platforms. However, most of national clusters are not involved in the European clusters, and 
national technology platforms are nearly non-existent (no State support was provided for facilitation, so 
they are facing “natural death”). To a very limited extent the continuation of a national platform 
existence has been secured through the national complex programmes and clusters. However these 
institutions are very young and their international links are very weak. Also, Lithuania does not have a 
considerable lobbying power in the EC. Many interviewed FP7/Horizon 2020 participants believed that 
sometimes it prevents them from winning the project. 
 Limited number of private R&I performers and a lack of critical mass. High and medium high 
technology manufacturing enterprises comprise less than 1% of all Lithuania enterprises. There is a low 
number of R&D performing enterprises in Lithuania (only 181 company used the R&D tax incentive in 
2013). Hence, there is a lack of critical mass of mature innovators to co-invest in large and long term 
R&D projects.  
To conclude, the main factors limiting participation in FP7/Horizon 2020 projects are: weak links to the 
European networks and limited international visibility, limited number of strong private R&I performers, 
availability of other more attractive (national) funding opportunities, and some specific features of the 
FP7/Horizon2020 projects, e.g. the fact that the evaluation and project implementation takes very long, there 
are specific budget and accounting rules, etc.   
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5. POLICY INSTRUMENTS FACILITATING THE PARTICIPATION IN (FP7) 
H2020 / (SF)ESIF 
 
There are measures taken in order to increase the participation in 7th Framework Programme/Horizon 2020. 
These instruments are implemented and administrated by MITA and LMT. These measures are described 
below: 
 Partial compensation of participant’s contribution to FP7 project. Partial compensation of 
participant’s contribution to the FP7 project is available since 2008. Since 2010 MITA is responsible for 
the administration of this instrument. Support is available only for public research institutions. Up to 25 
percent of contribution can be compensated. The compensation is given for one year period 
independently from the duration of FP7 project. During 2010-2014 €840,000 were compensated for 
161 FP7 participants (MITA, 2011a; MITA, 2012; MITA, 2013; MITA, 2014; MITA, 2015).  
 Compensation of FP7 application preparation costs. PROs can apply for compensation of FP7 
application preparation costs. The application does not have to be selected by the EC to be 
compensated, but it must be appropriate for the EC’s evaluation.  Up to €4,300 preparation costs can be 
compensated (MITA). This instrument is running from 2012 and is administrated by LMT and MITA. 215 
compensation contracts have been signed and awarded with €652,000 over 2011-2013 (LMT, 2015).  
However, this instrument has a serious bottleneck – application costs are only compensated for public 
research institutions, and not private enterprises, although participation of private enterprises in 
FP7/Horizon 2020 is much weaker. For example, in the case of JSC Vittamed, which coordinated two FP7 
projects (see the JSC Vittamed case study) and prepared the application themselves, the coordinator 
could not apply for compensation of the application preparation costs, so the project partner Kaunas 
University of Technology received the compensation. This is an unfair restriction in the current system of 
facilitating national participation in Horizon 2020. 
 Baltic Bonus. In December, 2014 MITA launched another instrument “Baltic Bonus”. It allows PROs 
partnering with the other Baltic states (Latvia or Estonia) in the application for Horizon 2020 to apply 
for additional €1,000 compensation of preparation of Horizon 2020 application costs (MITA). 
 VAT expenses compensation. In FP7 projects VAT expenses are not funded by the EC. In 2010 LMT 
launched an instrument, which enables FP7 participants to apply for compensation of VAT expenses 
paid by purchasing goods and services in Lithuania. 86 FP7 participants received their VAT expenses 
compensation worth €844,860 over 2010-2014 (LMT, 2015). 
 Compensation of international events costs. MITA is covering the researcher’s travel expenses to 
conferences or other events related to international programmes (e.g. Horizon 2020, Eureka, Eurostars). 
This way it helps potential participants finding partners for participation in international projects. This 
instrument also supports consortia meetings in foreign countries, intended for preparation of new 
applications and establishing new contacts. The consortia meetings in Lithuania can also be 
compensated (the equipment and rental costs are compensated).  
 Technical assistance and dissemination of information about FP7/Horizon 2020. MITA 
facilitates national participation in FP7/Horizon 2020 by implementing “soft” measures, such as 
increasing the awareness on rules and opportunities to participate in FP7/Horizon 2020. MITA with its 
NCP network organize consultations, presentations and other events for enterprises and PROs. In 
addition, LMT provides technical assistance for potential participants of FP7/Horizon 2020. For instance, 
LMT helps scientists to find international partners by using the NCP network, consults potential 
participants and proofreads their applications. 
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6. EVALUATION AND MONITORING MECHANISMS  
 
Five agencies (MITA, LVPA, ESFA, LMT, and CPVA, see Figure 1) are responsible for allocations of SF/ESIF 
funding on research and innovation in Lithuania. There are two main groups of SF/ESIF measures (this 
chapter is mainly based on Paliokaitė 2015): 
 Grants for projects through competitive calls for proposals. It includes administrative, 
quality/benefits and financial assessment of projects. The evaluation is based on publicly available 
proposal evaluation guidelines prepared by each agency separately. These guidelines must include 
information on evaluation procedures, peer-review process, proposal evaluation supervision, funding 
decision-making and others. The peer-review can be used in the project quality/benefits assessment. 
 State and regional planning. Regional development committees or relevant public authorities develop 
the projects plan. Project implementers are chosen according to the planning based on their 
administrative and financial assessment. Project management agency approaches potential project 
applicants offering them to submit their proposals within the time frame. For example, a large 
proportion of R&D funding over 2007-2013 was allocated for building or updating large R&D 
infrastructures. The funding was allocated using state planning method (institutional funding with 
competitive funding elements – only best R&D infrastructures are funded). The funding for the priority 
“Strengthening of researchers’ capacities” (€21m in 2013) is also mainly allocated through the state 
planning (around 90%). 
 
When Lithuanian funding agencies allocate funds through competitive calls, the expert’s peer-review is 
usually used to assess projects quality and benefits. It is based on research excellence criteria that are set in 
agency’s projects evaluation guidelines. The procedures are clear and transparent with some degree of 
flexibility, for instance, for small calls. Evaluation criteria are systematically applied. Responsibilities are 
divided according to competences: experts evaluate the quality of projects, while managing authorities take 
final decision on funding. It is considered that the evaluation is rigorous. The agencies follow the common 
guidelines on providing funding and, therefore, apply similar rules and procedures (adopted by the 
Government (2007) regulation). 
 LMT (the central funding agency for basic research and researchers’ mobility) is the main research 
funding agency in Lithuania. It allocates both budget and EU structural funds through programme-based 
competitive funding. About 15–20 calls for research funding and about 20 calls for other scientific 
activities funding are announced annually. The proposals evaluation is based on peer-review and 
publicly available evaluation criteria (e.g. one of criteria is the significance and validity of research idea). 
Experts define whether a project satisfies the minimum criteria to be considered eligible to receive 
funding. When all proposals are evaluated, experts arrange a projects priority list. The relevant 
programme management group makes the final decision on projects to be financed. The LMT 
Committees validate the funding decision (LMT, 2010a). The experts’ selection to conduct the peer-
review in LMT is based on internal LMT decisions (LMT, 2011; LMT, 2008). Experts are chosen by the 
LMT committees4 from the confidential LMT experts’ database and/or other suggested experts (LRS, 
2009). In principle, the participation of international peers is not limited as experts can be any qualified 
researchers and specialists, Lithuanian and foreign citizens working in Lithuania or abroad.  However, in 
practice the LMT chooses experts according to the financial value of calls. The Global Grant programme 
is systematically assessed by international experts (in Natural and Technical sciences international peer 
review covers 100 per cent of calls, while in Humanities and Social Sciences – 2/3 of calls) as it is 
designed to support world-class scientists and researchers’ projects. Other project experts’ evaluation is 
organised according to calls funding amount: if a call assigns less than €29,000, then usually it is 
reviewed by local experts. In other cases LMT hires Lithuanian experts working abroad or international 
experts. A majority of grant proposals are submitted in Lithuanian language (with a short summary in 
English), which poses linguistic barriers to participation of international reviewers5. When a project grant 
(e.g. Global Grant programme) is considered significant, LMT asks to submit both Lithuanian and English 
versions of proposal what facilitates the international peer-review. Another obstacle is experts’ 
availability. Local experts usually propose themselves to LMT (90% of experts in LMT experts’ database), 
while foreign experts are approached by LMT. 
                                                        
4 There are two LMT committees: 1 - Human and social science committee, 2 - Natural and technology science committee. They are 
formed from scientists representing the relevant science field. They are proposed by Research, HE and other institutions.  
5 The State Commission of the Lithuanian Language clarified that all grant proposals must be submitted in Lithuanian language to 
ensure usage of a State language.  
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 Agency for Science, Innovation and Technology (MITA) uses expert’s peer-review (MITA, 2011b) to 
evaluate proposals quality in allocating programme funding (MITA, 2011c). MITA uses its own experts’ 
database to select experts for peer review. 
 LVPA administers a number of ERDF-funded business support measures including nine measures 
devoted to R&D projects. The project applications evaluation are based on peer review. LVPA has a few 
methods to choose their reviewers. There are project managers in LVPA who coordinate projects. Each 
of them focuses on a thematic field, and in some cases they themselves evaluate applications. When 
applications require very specific technical knowledge, LVPA hires external experts. The key 
requirements for an expert are: five year professional experience and/or a PhD. LVPA has a pool of 
experts to choose from. Experts from this pool are hired using short term labour contracts. Reviewers 
are usually hired from Lithuania. Only in rare cases LVPA hires international experts or Lithuanians 
working abroad, because it is more expensive. LVPA also collaborates with universities to find reviewers. 
LVPA has signed specific expert service contracts with five Lithuanian universities - universities provide 
LVPA with experts under their request. A high importance is given to avoid the conflict of interest. Firstly, 
before signing a contract, experts do not know whose applications they are going to evaluate. Secondly, 
before hiring expert, LVPA carefully checks whether an expert has a conflict of interest. Finally, while 
signing a contract expert must declare her/his interests.  
 
In summary, although the Lithuanian public bodies responsible for allocating SF/ESIF funds apply some 
principles of international peer review to a large extent (i.e. research excellence criteria are applied and the 
funding agencies are rigorous in their peer review procedures), there are some obstacles limiting 
evaluation objectivity: 
a. International experts are used on systematic basis for evaluating large research projects only by LMT, 
but not by other agencies that provide SF/ESIF funding for research and innovation. Currently, the cost 
of hiring international peer reviewers is considered too high. Also, using Lithuanian language in the 
forms and applications in most cases preclude using international peer reviewers for evaluating 
projects. Use of local experts in a small country like Lithuania raise problems of either (a) competent 
evaluation of highly technical content of R&D projects, or (b) subjective evaluation, given the very 
fragmented R&D base in Lithuania, where all experts working in the same field know each other and 
often compete for funding. 
b. The „paper-based“ application procedure provides incentive for firms to hire consulting companies to 
draft grant applications that appeal to the reviewers but favour form over substance. While the 
administrative burden itself is a drawback for researchers, these consultancy companies, beside the 
additional cost, may be politically affiliated and affect the objectivity of the evaluation. Evaluation of 
applications was improved since the first SF calls (see above on the LVPA’s system), however avoidance 
of conflicts on interest in a country as small as Lithuania is a complicated task.  
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7. ENHANCING OR LIMITING THE SYNERGIES?  
Ensuring synergies between Horizon 2020 and cohesion funding, the smart specialisation strategies are 
foreseen to have a key role to play in terms of capacity building and providing a stairway to excellence 
(European Parliament resolution, 2011). They are expected to consider both upstream and downstream 
actions to and from Horizon 2020 as key actions for the CP funding. In this context the metaphor „stairway to 
excellence“ can be also used to mark upstream actions, which aim is to prepare R&I players to participate in 
Horizon 2020 projects and accessing national funding allocated on a competitive basis. The key upstream 
actions for cohesion funding include - but are not strictly limited with - the investments in innovative 
solutions and research infrastructures and equipment, in particular those of European interest. This includes 
support for „satellite infrastructures“ linked to the ESFRI-related RI, national/regional research facilities and 
technology centres, competence centres and science parks, with a clear focus on enhancing applied research, 
through reinforced cooperation with industry to leverage private R&I investment. In addition to RI a number 
of other upstream interventions can be supported, including smaller research partnering facilities of regional 
importance upgrading into research excellence; the modernisation of universities and research organisations, 
including the development of post-graduate studies; the improvement of research skills of students, the 
training of researchers, as well as developing technology auditing, international partner search and 
information campaigns in firms and technology centres to stimulate and facilitate participation in Horizon 
2020 (Non-paper on synergies between Horizon 2020 and Cohesion Policy funds). 
Factors limiting the synergies between ESIF and FP7/Horizon2020 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the FP7 activities (NCPs), cohesion funded, national programmes and transnational 
cooperation (under ETC and EUSBSR) activities have rather been all rather separate streams of planning and 
actions (even if operated by the same organisation) in Lithuania. There is no strategy or tactics of creating 
synergies between the SF/ESIF or FP7 measures. On the contrary, the prevailing opinion at the Ministry of 
Economy’s Structural Funds Department is that fostering of synergies might lead to duplicated EU funding. 
Apart from lack of long term vision and strategy for building a stairway of excellence, no specific rules, legal 
aspects, or implementation modalities (i.e. timing of the calls, eligibility criteria, and evaluation criteria) for 
ESIF calls that may limit synergies between ESIF and H2020 were identified. Also, before 2015 there were no 
direct national instruments facilitating synergies between Horizon 2020 and SF. The interviewed experts 
noted, that since Lithuanians are not very active or successful at the FP7 calls, there is lack of pressure from 
the interest groups on the policy makers, and so there is no strong impulse to create mechanisms facilitating 
synergies.  
The interviewees themselves thought that there was no negative impact of the competition between the SF 
and FP7, because FP7 attracts the highest level research groups who deem it prestigious to take part in 
FP7/Horizon2020. However, there is potential negative effect of the overall lack of human resources in the 
PROs and the high administrative load SF/ESIF have created (especially when constructing new R&D 
infrastructures and procuring equipment), which may be underestimated by the interviewees.  
Factors enhancing the synergies between ESIF and BP7/Horizon2020 
2007-2013 period 
Despite the strong opinion at the Ministry of Economy that facilitation of synergies should be avoided in 
order not to facilitate double funding, there were some positive, although not very effective, examples in 
2010-2014. The specific rules of measure “Intellect LT” (LVPA, 2010), which provides direct funding for 
business R&D (grants), provide that: 
 The applicants could apply with partners (companies or research institutions) registered in Lithuania or 
abroad. In practise Lithuanian institutions do not apply with partners from abroad. However, during the 
project participants collaborated with companies from abroad (e.g. by buying expertise from them). 
Hence, this could contribute to enhanced international networking and trust and indirectly lead to further 
international collaboration. 
 Business trips abroad were among the eligible costs. 
 Among the key quality evaluation criteria there was a criterion “Experience of collaborating with 
research institutions and at international level (implemented Framework or Eureka projects over the last 
3 years)”. The author counted 16 Lithuanian companies who have benefited from both the Framework 
Programmes, and Intellect LT. Given that Intellect LT supported 260 companies, it shows that only a 
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very small number of current R&I private performers are interested in the EU“s international 
programmes. 
The Lithuanian Research Council, while providing grants for public sector R&D (measures “Global Grant” 
and “Projects of research groups”) in 2010-2014, applied those rules (LMT, 2010b): 
 Among the key quality evaluation criteria was “Importance of project results, their dissemination and 
project internationalisation”. 
 Trips abroad were among the eligible costs. 
Finally, the Ministry of Education and Science in cooperation with Ministry of Economy, MITA, ESFA and LVPA, 
implemented a joint projects funding scheme called “The Egg” in 2012-2014. In this scheme the idea 
was to fund joint high quality public R&D projects having a business partner. In this case, LVPA funded the 
business part of the project from the measure Intellect LT (the 2013 call). The public R&D part of the project 
was funded using the State planning method. The call for preliminary applications of research organisations 
was launched in 2012. MITA evaluated the applications and invited 30 selected institutions to submit full 
applications. These 30 selected projects got support up to €1.2m from the measure „Promotion of high 
level international research” (ESFA) in 2013. The latter measure applied those rules (ŠMM, 2012): 
 One of the two aims of this measure was to carry out high international quality R&D projects with the 
use of international industry companies and (or) international research institutions. Each project had to 
contribute to this aim to be eligible for funding. 
 Among the quality criteria were those: 
o The applicant and/or partner has previous collaboration experience with international research 
centres or international companies or international universities and PROs regarding delivering high 
international quality research (up to 20 points). 
o Experience of implemented Framework, COST or Eureka projects (up to 10 points). 
o High impact of intended project results on the applicant/partner R&D competitiveness (public 
private partnership, visibility at international level, attraction of researchers from abroad) (up to 5 
points. 
o The project implements mobility visits to international research centres/companies/PROs to work on 
joint international level R&D projects (up to 5 points). 
As an example, Kaunas Technology University’s Institute of Materials Science participated in the measure 
„Promotion of high level international research”. The institute benefited from the project “Fundamental 
investigation of surface relief and molecular forces influence on the self-organization of nanoparticles and 
nanofibers” (€423,600). According to the beneficiary, this project helped the Institute to build research 
capacity and find solid international partners, which resulted in a twinning proposal for Horizon 2020 
(“Boosting the scientific excellence and innovation capacity in novel Functional Nano composites of Kaunas 
University of Technology and its Twinning partners”) and other international projects outside the EU (e.g. with 
the National Institute for Materials Science of Japan). 
Other indirect upstream and downstream synergies were identified: 
 PROs acquired new R&D infrastructure from the measure „Strengthening of the General Science and 
Studies infrastructure” (€307m) which allowed them to pursue new lines of research and join 
international level consortia and opportunities that were not possible before. For example, K. Baršauskas 
Ultrasound Research Institute of Kaunas University of Technology purchased new equipment (ultrasonic 
microscope, immersion ultrasound stands, x-ray micro-tomography equipment) under the financing of 
EU SF project “Creation of national open access R&D centre in Kaunas University of Technology”. This 
new infrastructure enabled K. Baršauskas Ultrasound Research Institute to successfully participate and 
implement a number of FP7 projects (e.g. “SprinkTest”, “CreepTest”, “SAFEJOINT” etc.). 
 EU SF(“New Opportunities” measure) funded export promotion of the products created as a result of 
FP7-funded R&D projects (introduction to the market). For example, JSC “Vittamed” coordinated two FP7 
projects “Brainsafe” and “Brainsafe II”. A new, non-invasive absolute intracranial pressure (aICP) 
measurement device was developed during the “Brainsafe” project. During “Brainsafe II” the device was 
upgraded and final product created, ready to be introduced to the market. The EU SF measure “New 
Opportunities” was used for this purpose. The project “JSC “Vittamed" export development and 
promotion in foreign markets” were used to present the new neurodiagnostics technologies to the world 
market, find new business contacts and start product export. 
Plans for 2015-2020 
24 
 
What regards business R&I projects, there is no debate nor specific plans on fostering synergies between 
ESIF and Horizon 2020 in the new 2015-2020 period. However, there was a discussion that the newly 
developed pre-commercial procurement (PCP) measure “Smart procurement” could be linked to 
Horizon 2020. Consortia of public procurers working together on joint PCPs can receive 70% worth co-
financing from EC under Horizon 2020. Lithuanian authorities are creating legal framework for PCP and are 
aware of the opportunity to receive co-financing under Horizon 2020. The final decisions on the measure 
(and its funding sources) have not been made by the time this Report was prepared. 
A new measure “InnoConnect LT” (€1.5m, see Figure 5 below) will tackle the problem of weak involvement 
in international clusters and other networks. Up to €2900 can be provided for participating in the initiatives 
facilitated by the Enterprise Europe Network. 
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Figure 5. ESIF measures for business R&I, 2015-2020 
 
Source: Ministry of Economy, December 2014 
The Ministry of Education and Science has increased attention to international level R&D and 
internationalisation in the new 2014-2020 OP: 
 Creation of excellence centres (about €27m will be allocated for excellence centres and parallel 
laboratories). This measure aims to create internationally competitive R&D centres having high quality 
competence and critical mass of R&D infrastructure and researchers and engaged in structural 
partnerships with leading foreign R&D centres. It is discussed that this measure would provide co-
financing to Lithuanian applications selected by the Horizon 2020 action “Teaming“. Preliminary, two 
Lithuanian applications have been submitted.  
 Parallel funding for Horizon widening participation schemes. ŠMM is following the EC 
recommendations to link ESIF with Horizon 2020 and is planning to co-finance the Lithuanian 
participants in Horizon 2020 measures as “Twinning”. 
 Creation of parallel laboratories (about €27m will be allocated for excellence centres and parallel 
laboratories). The aim is to create physical and virtual infrastructure required for structured partnerships 
with leading research centres abroad. Parallel laboratories would allow the partners to use each other’s 
infrastructure, and thus lead to joint R&D projects. 
 Creation of European RIs and integration into ESFRI/ERIC (about €27m). Creation of the European 
RIs would be implemented according to the Roadmap of the national RIs (2011). Funding will be 
allocated for integration into ESFRI and meeting the necessary requirements.  
 Finally, ŠMM plans for continuation of „joint research projects“ („The Egg“ scheme) and funding 
has been allocated for it (preliminary, about €72m). The final decision on the implementation scheme 
has not been reached by the time when this Report was submitted (June 2015). 
There is also a discussion regarding allocation of ESIF funding (from the measures administered by LMT) to 
the Horizon 2020 projects that receive high evaluation score but are not selected. No decision has been 
reached by the time when this report was prepared.  
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8. TAKE-UP OF PUBLIC SECTOR RESEARCH RESULTS 
Given the historical separation of science and industry and the prevailing differences in culture, a lack of 
productive collaboration between the industry and public research sectors is one of the most challenging 
issues in the Lithuania’s innovation system. In spite of the current policy effort to strengthen science-industry 
links, deficiencies are present on both sides – poor commercialisation endeavour and a lack of commercially-
valuable results in the academy, on the one hand, and low ability to look outside the short term company’s 
horizon, to identify and exploit external knowledge, on the business side. Information asymmetry, lack of 
motivation from both sides and sometimes too rigid setting of public policies only reinforce the weaknesses 
mentioned above. Few EU SF funded instruments attempted to address this challenge and faced mixed 
success, due to both lack of well-thought design and the lack of more substantial efforts. 
Better cooperation between public research and private enterprises as seen as a key focus to promote 
knowledge transfer. The instrument “Integrated science, studies and business centres – valleys” worth around 
€400m was introduced for fostering open innovation and transfer of knowledge between public research and 
private enterprises. Under this instrument 21 open access centres (R&D laboratories, which should provide 
R&D services for business and other interested applicants for a particular price) have been constructed in the 
“valleys”. So far, only two Technology Transfer Offices started operation in Kaunas Technology University and 
Vilnius Gediminas Technical University. Despite the huge investments the involvement of the private 
enterprises in these projects have been limited. All the investments allowed public research institutions to 
modernise infrastructure rather than foster collaboration between public research and private enterprises. 
The new Operational Programme plans to finance operation of new technology transfer offices in other 
universities as well.  
Measures supporting R&D cooperation between public/academic/not-for-profit sector research institutions 
and enterprises (High technology development programme 2011–2013, the Industrial biotechnology 
development programme 2011–2013) were implemented.  Also there were measures supporting investments 
in innovative clusters development (Inocluster LT, Inocluster LT+, Inogeb LT-3). However direct financial 
support for collaboration of science and business in joint R&D projects and cluster development projects was 
relatively low, compared to other policy instruments (Paliokaitė, 2015). 
Evidence of poor Lithuanian knowledge transfer and open innovation performance is presented in Table 7. In 
the majority of measures presented in the table the experimental research activities are implemented. The 
results of projects are prototype and just in a rare cases a product ready to be installed to the market. It is 
unclear whether created prototypes are tested, upgraded and introduced to the market after the projects are 
finished. 
Table 7. Project results 2007-2013. 
 
ATPP 
2011-
2013 
PBPP 
2011-
2013 
FP7 
2007-
2013 
Eureka Eurostars Total 
EC contribution to Lithuania participants, in €m 3,40 0,80 8,69 14,01 0,89 27,79 
Number of projects 21 6 12 (7 
finished) 
33 (27 
finished) 
6 (4 
finished) 
78 (65 
finished) 
Product 
development 
cycle 
Results 
ATPP 
2011-
2013 
PBPP 
2011-
2013 
FP7 
2007-
2013 
Eureka Eurostars Total 
Research Patent applications 7 3 N/A N/A N/A 10 
Experimental 
development 
New products, services or prototypes 85 9 5 N/A - 99 
New products, services or prototypes 
tested. 
- - 1 N/A - 1 
Innovation New products, services or prototypes 
created and introduced to the market 
- - - N/A 4 4 
Source: MITA, 2014, EC, 2014. 
Notes: a) ATPP – High technology development programme, PBPP - industrial biotechnology development programme. b) Only high 
technology and knowledge intensive services sectors are presented in the table. Also only projects coordinated by Lithuanian participants 
are included into FP7 projects analysis. c) FP7 and Eurostars projects results were summed up using projects final and interim reports. 
Not all the relevant information may be provided in these reports (e.g. registered patents). d) FP7 and Eurostars projects results were 
summed up by authors while ATPP and PBPP projects results were summed up by MITA. As a result, the results between these 
programmes should be compared with caution. 
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In Lithuania, often the experimental development (especially at the 6-9 technology readiness levels6, i.e. 
prototype testing and pilot manufacturing) is the missing link. Companies lack related financial and 
technological services. About 30% of surveyed manufacturing companies (Visionary Analytics, 2014) lack 
prototype testing and pilot manufacturing services. The EU SF implementing agencies, especially during the 
first calls for tenders, hired scientists from the academia to evaluate the applications, and these evaluators 
were looking for “hard” R&D (i.e. the first stages of research and development in the innovation cycle, 
focusing on the Frascati manual). However, at the current stage of development, there is a great need also 
for rapid experimentation and prototyping (later stages of technology development). So far there have not 
been close to market policy instruments in Lithuania. Some new measures fostering close to market 
operations will implemented during the 2014-2020 ESIF period (see figure above, Innosertification, also 
Intellect LT now includes prototyping and pilot manufacturing activities).  
One of the most successful instrument fostering cooperation between public research institutions and 
enterprises is Ino-vouchers LT. The pilot innovation vouchers scheme was launched in 2010 and after the 
confirmed success was upgraded to the Ino-vouchers LT scheme in 2012 (the annual budget is €1.65m). The 
voucher enables an SME to buy R&D expertise or knowledge from a research or higher education institution. 
Supported activities: industrial or applied research; technological development (experimental or development, 
design and technological works); technical feasibility studies. 1026 ino-vouchers (€4m) were funded over 
2010-2014 from both ERDF and national sources. As an instrument facilitating first science-business 
collaboration contacts innovation vouchers were not expected to achieve a significant effect on R&D and 
innovation. However its effect on facilitating the networks and collaboration culture could not be 
underestimated. Many interviewed beneficiaries as well as respondents of beneficiary surveys (Visionary 
Analytics, 2014) highlight high satisfaction and perceived usefulness of this instrument even despite its small 
value. Apparently, the innovation vouchers instrument, intended as a “candy” for otherwise unsuccessful 
university-industry collaboration has been very successful due to these conditions: 
 An easy and “no stress” administration - no restrictions, no administrative load, fast evaluation 
according to “first come – first serve” principle, which is very different from the SMEs’ experience with 
any other SF-funded instrument. The mode of delivery based on a fixed sum principle, standardized 
activities and outputs, also creates less administrative cost for the implementing agency, and thus could 
be mainstreamed for other easy-to-standardize incentives in the next period. 
 Meets the high demand for quick experimentation / rapid prototyping / incremental innovations which is 
not otherwise supported. 
However, the experience of working with the university researchers has not been always smooth, there has 
been a lot of disappointment and misunderstandings. Overall, according to the interviewees and available 
studies (e.g. Visionary Analytics, 2014), bbusiness and public research sectors collaboration will not work 
effectively unless the current researchers’ career system and public R&D institutional funding mechanism are 
changed. The current system does not encourage public sector researchers to focus on commercialising R&D 
results or providing R&D services for business.   
Despite above described measures, the current policy mix did not have an expected impact on the 
collaboration between the science and business sectors. A few explanations of poor current policy mix 
performance is outlined in Lithuanian R&I Country Report: lack of a proper legal base for the successful 
commercialisation of scientific projects, information asymmetry, low quality of scientific research, and – 
especially - the insufficient in-house capabilities and the passive and bureaucratic stance adopted by 
universities as well as a lack of a collaboration projects pipeline.  
Another reason for the low science-business collaboration is fragmented innovation and knowledge transfer 
policy. Different strategies (and their institutional “owners”) focus on separate elements (Paliokaitė, 2015). 
For example the “clusters” approach fostered by the Ministry of Economy has not been coordinated with the 
“valleys” approach encouraged by the Ministry of Education and Science. As a result, firstly, there is a huge 
fragmentation - 45 business clusters in a country as small as Lithuania (most comprised by less than 10 
companies). Secondly science valleys are mainly university projects without the considerable involvement of 
enterprises. 
Finally, universities, research institutes and their researchers still lack motivation to commercialize research 
and work with industry. The lack of motivation is a result of career system in universities and a huge teaching 
workload of the researchers. The career system in universities supports indicators such as teaching hours, 
                                                        
6 Some sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technology_readiness_level; 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2014_2015/annexes/h2020-wp1415-annex-g-trl_en.pdf  
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academic papers and similar and does not support knowledge transfer to industry. Ministry of Education and 
Science tried to solve these problems with the results-based university funding model (more value is 
attributed to R&D contracts with industry) and the Recommendations on the intellectual property 
management in universities. However, studies (Technopolis Group and Ernst & Young, 2014; Paliokaitė et al, 
2015) reveal that the current measures are not effective enough.  
  
29 
 
9. COUNTRY TAILORED POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
 
To sum up, there is a number of factors limiting Lithuania’s participation in the FP7/Horizon 2020 projects 
and the synergies between the EU SF and national policy instruments and Horizon 2020 as well as other 
international programmes. The remaining challenges and related policy suggestions are discussed below. 
General policy suggestions 
1. Lack of coordination leads to huge fragmentation of instruments, programmes, institutions and 
infrastructures. A key challenge is thus to reduce fragmentation and improve policy capacities: 
 Ensure better links between the fragmented policy routes, by reducing duplications and ensuring 
synergies. An example: in the previous programming period, a cluster, a science park and an open 
access centre all operating in the same R&D sector (say, food industry) would compete for SF 
funding for delivering similar innovation promotion and technology transfer services. To ensure 
synergies, the State should review the currently existing structures, for example, some clusters can 
become part of the existing science and technology parks (STPs). In some cases, science parks could 
lead the activities of clusters. The strongest organization can become a project leader of “joint 
project” or “joint initiative”. Another example – ensuring links between the development of R&D 
programmes, higher education programmes and R&D infrastructure using SF/ESIF funding.  
 Coordinating agency (e.g. MITA) with good programme management capacities and links to thematic 
teams in all other agencies. Improve existing framework (Strategic Council and MITA need to be 
strengthened) and policy intelligence. 
 Attention and resources granted to effective programme management, with a focus on 
simplification, abandoning the risk-averse and process-oriented approach, strengthening the 
implementation capacity in the agencies. 
2. The existing target group in Lithuania for the excellence-based competitive R&D measures is rather 
limited – consisting mainly of the limited number of top-tier research groups and few knowledge-based 
(spin-off) companies. Raising the allocations for direct R&D measures without simultaneously dealing 
with the pipeline creation through capacity building might result in problems with absorption of available 
funding. Policy mix thus lacked focus on the pro-active incentives to encourage companies, entrepreneurs 
to become involved in the discovery of opportunities for diversification and innovation. In the new 2015-
2020 period the policy spotlight has to move from “hard” infrastructure development to 
absorptive capacity strengthening and acceleration of new ideas pipeline through the 
innovation support services, such as: 
 Mechanisms (e.g. vouchers) to boost experiments and discoveries while encouraging connections 
among economic agents; 
 Industry, technology and market foresights, studies on long term future trends and likely 
development of technologies that could improve the forward looking capabilities and agility,  
 Innovation scouting / brokerage and other „soft“ innovation support services aimed at emphasizing 
the value of innovation and linking the activities of different actors in the innovation system 
(businesses and research institutions).  
 Lack of skilled specialists is an emerging challenge for innovation development in SMEs which needs 
to be addressed. 
 Policy mix has to acknowledge the different maturity of existing and potential innovators: need for 
diversified and tailor-made instruments. 
 Furthermore, at the lowest level of the „competence stairway“ there is a large group of potential 
„consumers of innovations“ in both traditional industries and the public sector that are in need of 
new technological solutions and can thus contribute to the creation of market for innovations, given 
that the market is strongest force for innovation facilitation. 
3. In spite of the current policy effort to strengthen take up of public sector R&D results, deficiencies are 
present on both sides – poor commercialisation endeavour and a lack of commercially-valuable results in 
the academy, on the one hand, and low ability to look outside the short term company’s horizon, to 
identify and exploit external knowledge, on the business side. Information asymmetry, lack of motivation 
from both sides and sometimes too rigid setting of public policies only reinforce the weaknesses in 
creating strong science-industry partnerships and facilitating science entrepreneurship: 
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 Effects are limited due to overall non-systemic governance, characterised by limited synergies, 
networks, clusters and associations; for example, failure to re-align the science „valleys“ and industry 
clusters; as a result Lithuania has 45 clusters, 21 „open access centres“, 10 science and technology 
parks, etc. In a country with extremely low social capital, even the emergence of many small clusters 
as “closed clubs” can be viewed as a first step towards more effective collaboration. The task for the 
second step is to strengthen the clusters and create incentives for merging them or “killing” the 
unproductive ones. Connect the current public R&D infrastructure into a single R&D services network 
(in the open access centres, clusters, etc.). 
 Innovation voucher is considered an effective and highly demanded instrument considering the 
current stage of Lithuanian SMEs (demand for rapid experimentation and prototyping) and could be 
mainstreamed as a mode of delivery in the next period. 
 In order to achieve economies of scale by using funding of various state institutions, it is advisable 
to focus on larger rather than small-scale projects and the combined use of policy instruments, 
especially when it comes to public private cooperation concerning mature private innovators. These 
larger projects usually involve several stakeholders, do not rely on a single source of funding, and 
have large budgets, longer period of implementation and a few groups of beneficiaries. 
Specific policy suggestions 
1. There is a need for better streamlined targets, policies, incentives for internationalisation, 
for example: 
 None of S3 priorities should include purely national agendas. 
 Limit the RI infrastructure investments to those consortia who are able to demonstrate strong 
industry commitment and international collaboration dimension (incl. linking with EU RIs and BSR 
clusters) integrated into their research strategies.   
 Implementation of the „parallel labs“ instruments and ESFRI-related measures. 
 Capacity building of the policy makers and staff of various ESIF agencies that are not aware on the 
possibilities/needs of creating the synergies between ESIF and Horizon 2020, remain reluctant and 
view the synergies as a risk for “duplication of funding”.  
 Creating an EU level benchmark on Horizon2020 and the synergies, or a similar EU level benchmark, 
as an additional trigger. 
2. Lack of motivation and skills at the individual level (researchers). The career system of 
Lithuanian researchers does not support orientation towards results or international projects (researchers 
are mostly evaluated for papers and teaching hours). Also, most scientists have too much administrative 
work and high teaching loads: 
 Promoting science entrepreneurship, e.g. researchers’ contracts should be adjusted to provide time to 
work with the business community and Horizon 2020. 
 A similar change should occur at institutional level (incl. IPR policies). 
3. Weak links with European networks. Lithuania is a small country and its companies are not well-
known in Europe. This reason creates a difficulty to find a consortium partners. Most of the already 
formed European consortia are not willing to open up to new partners: 
 To reinforce existing science-industry partnerships and their linkages with EU counterparts 
establishing framework for wider national participation in new types of EU level RTD collaboration.  
 Extend and strengthen measures like InnoConnect to fund various networks, and continue funding 
researchers’ mobility. 
4. Horizon 2020 projects are less attractive for private enterprises because they are perceived as 
very risky (low success rate), having high administrative load and being far away from the market: 
 Strengthen national framework for proactive position of Lithuanian entities in project preparatory 
activities through dedicated project assistance and partner search grant scheme available for both 
public and private R&D (currently financial assistance is mainly available for PROs only).  
 Different routes in providing ESIF funding for business R&D: 
o Strengthen capacity building and fund many smaller R&D projects of „potential“ and „new“ 
innovators 
31 
 
o Less but large scale projects of mature innovators linked to „joint initiatives“, also simultaneous 
funding for selected Horizon 2020 projects, also providing ESIF funding for the nearly selected 
projects (not just PROs, but all types of applicants). 
 At the EU level the administration rules of Horizon 2020 needs to be reviewed (e.g. the rule on 
calculating hourly rates according to usual accounting practice based on actual personnel costs (see 
Chapter 4)  reduces the motivation to participate in those countries where salaries are lower). 
 Better awareness raising and visibility of good practices (related to SMEs’ projects leading to 
commercialisation of products) is advised to overcome a dominant perception that “evaluation of 
FP7/Horizon 2020 projects take very long and projects themselves take much longer than it would 
take if a company implements an internal project”.   
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ATPP High technology development programme 
BONUS Joint Baltic Sea Research and Development Programme 
BSR Baltic Sea Region 
CP Cohesion Policy 
CPVA Central Project Management Agency 
EC European Commission 
ESFRI European Strategy Forum for Research Infrastructures  
ERIC European Research Infrastructure Consortium 
ESIF European Structural and Investment Funds 
ERDF  European Regional Development Fund 
ESFA European Social Fund Agency 
ETC European Territorial Cooperation, formerly the INTERREG Community Initiative 
EU European Union 
EUSBSR European Union Strategy for Baltic Sea Region 
EU-27 European Union including 27 Member States 
FDI Foreign Direct Investments 
FP6 6TH Framework Programme  
FP7 7th Framework Programme 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HEI Higher education institutions 
ICP Intracranial Pressure 
ICT Information and Communication Technologies 
IPR Intellectual Property Rights 
IPTS Institute for Prospective Technological Studies 
JSC Joint Stock Company 
KET Key Enabling Technology 
LVPA Lithuanian Business Support Agency  
LIC Lithuanian Innovation Centre  
LRS Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania 
LMT Lithuanian Research Council 
MITA Agency for Innovation, Technology and Science 
MOSTA Research and higher education monitoring and analysis centre 
MS Member State 
NCP National Contact Points 
OP Operational Programme 
PBPP Industrial biotechnology development programme 
PCP Pre-commercial procurement 
PRO Public Research Organisations 
R&D Research and development 
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RI Research infrastructures 
R&I Research and innovation 
RTD Research and Technological Development 
SCM Social sciences and humanities 
SF Structural Funds 
SFMIS Structural Funds Management Information System 
SME Small and Medium Sized Enterprise 
S&T Science and Technology 
ŠMM Ministry of Education and Science 
ŪM Ministry of Economy 
Valley Integrated centre of studies, science and business 
VAT Value added tax 
VC Venture Capital 
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ANNEX 1. LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
No. Interviewees 
Date of 
interview 
Place 
1.  Dr. Linas Eriksonas, manager of the Plastics cluster, FP7/Horizon 2020 consultant 23-01-2015 Vilnius 
2.  Dr. Arūnas Beržinskas, Head of international programmes department, MITA 13-02-2015 Vilnius 
3.  Prof. dr. Gintaras Valušis, director, Center for Physical Sciences and Technology 19-02-2015 Vilnius 
4.  Dr. Rolandas Urbonas, deputy director, Lithuanian Energy Institute 23-02-2015 Vilnius 
5.  Edvardas Satkauskas, Lithuania Office director, JSC “Vittammed” 23-02-2015 Vilnius 
6.  Assoc. Prof. Leonas Balaševičius, director, Kaunas University of Technology, 
Department Of Research Affairs 
25-02-2015 Vilnius 
7.  Dr. Renaldas Raišutis, Principal Researcher, Kaunas University of Technology prof. 
K. Barsauskas Ultrasound Research Institute 
28-02-2015 Vilnius 
8.  Rokas Bagdzevičius, project coordinator, JSC “Light Conversion” 27-02-2015 Vilnius 
9.  Dr. Aistė Vilkanauskytė, Head of LMT International Programmes Unit 17-03-2015 Vilnius 
10.  Ramunė Rudokienė, Head of ŠMM Science Division. 17-03-2015 Vilnius 
11.  Ignas Paukštys, Deputy Director, Project Management Department LVPA 17-03-2015 Vilnius 
12.  Prof. habil. dr. Sigitas Tamulevičius, Director of the Institute of Materials Science, 
Kaunas University of Technology 
10-04-2015 Vilnius 
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ANNEX 3. ESIF FUNDING FOR R&I RELATED MEASURES 
 
Table 3.1. ESIF funds, 2007-2015 
Category Measure name 
Funding, 
€m 
Amount 
paid, €m 
No. 
funded 
projects 
Success 
rate* 
Research funding 
(PROs) 
Support of scientists and researchers mobility and students 
scientific work 
€36.7m €33.7m 11 100% 
R&D infrastructure 
Improvement of the Qualifications and Competencies of 
Scientists and Researchers (scientific databases, e-
documents) 
€21.2m €19.9m 6 100% 
Development of the High Level Research Centres and 
Competence Centres 
€8.6m €8.6m 5 100% 
Creation of National Open Source Scientific Communication 
Centre 
€29m €29m 1 100% 
Creation of Infrastructure, aimed at the Improvement and 
Dissemination of Knowledge about R&D, Technologies and 
Innovation 
€1.1m €1.1m 1 100% 
Research funding 
(PROs) 
Promotion of high quality international research €13.8m €12.9m 30 100% 
Research funding 
(PROs) 
Implementation of national research programs and other 
research and technological development projects 
€7.2m €5.2m 13 93% 
R&D infrastructure 
Strengthening of the General Science and Studies 
infrastructure 
€307m €232.6
m 
33 92% 
Research funding 
(PROs) 
Implementation of R&D activities under national complex 
programme thematic topics 
€10.2m €9.2m 19 76% 
Innovation promotion 
services 
Inogeb LT-2 €35.1m €20.9m 10 71% 
Knowledge transfer, 
networks 
Strengthening of R&D thematic networks and associations €10m €9.1m 41 67% 
Innovation promotion 
services 
Inogeb LT-3 €9.3m €4.7m 4 67% 
Knowledge transfer, 
networks 
Ino-vouchers LT €3.5m €2.3m 815 58% 
Researchers 
placements 
State Support for Employment of skilled personnel in 
companies 
€0.94m €0.7m 4 57% 
Innovation promotion 
services 
Inogeb LT-1 €6.4m €6.2m 14 52% 
Direct funding for 
business R&D  
Intellect LT €60.3m €42.5m 261 51% 
Intellect LT + €69.8m €46.8m 132 42% 
Idea LT €4.3m €3.8m 178 37% 
Knowledge transfer, 
networks 
Inocluster LT €3.6m €2.2m 19 35% 
Inocluster LT+ €18.9m €9.7m 13 30% 
Research funding 
(PROs) 
Support to the scientific work of scientists and other 
researchers (Global Grant) 
€33.2m €29.2m 106 30% 
Technology upgrading Leader LT €97m €92m 91 25% 
Source: Lithuania EU Structural assistance webpage http://www.esparama.lt/patvirtintos-priemones  
NB: Marked in grey are the measures potentially facing problems with absorption. 
* The term „success rate“ shows share of applications which were successful (received ESIF funding). Low(er) success 
rates point to high(er) demand for ESIF instruments, and vice versa. 
 
  
38 
 
Table 3.2. ESIF funds transferred to the beneficiaries in 2013 (annual funding figures) 
Classification Measures  €m % 
R&I FUNDING 
Target group – business companies. Managing agencies: LVPA, MITA 
Innovation-friendly 
environment  
 Innovation support services and investments into institutional/absorptive capacity 
(Inogeb LT 1-3),   
 Assistant-2 (construction of technology and art incubators) 
14.08 7.70% 
Knowledge transfer 
and cluster 
cooperation 
 Inocluster LT/ LT+, R&D thematic networks and associations 
 Innovation vouchers.  
5.92 3.24% 
R&D in firms  Idea LT, Intellect LT, LT+ 15.21 8.31% 
INDIRECT INNOVATION FUNDING 
Target group – business companies. Managing agencies: LVPA, INVEGA 
Creation and 
growth of 
enterprises  
 Leader LT (production technology acquisition/upgrade in firms);  
 Process LT (organisational innovations);  
 Invest LT; Invest LT+, Invest LT-2, Assistant-3 (FDI attraction measures and 
development of industrial parks); 
 Controlling fund, Compensation of SMEs“ credit interests, and Guarantees fund. 
54.70 29.9% 
 
RESEARCH FUNDING 
Target group – HEIs and PROs and their researchers. Managing agencies: LMT, CPVA, ESFA, MITA 
R&D Infrastructure   Economy Growth OP, Priority 1, investments into the development and upgrade of 
research infrastructures in the science, studies and business „valleys“ 
50.63 27.68% 
Human Resources 
for research  
 „Global grant“, research mobility and other measures under the HR Development 
OP, Priority 3, including the funding for R&D governance and policy analysis, 
thematic networks etc. 
42.40 23.07% 
Total ~€182.94 100% 
Source: based on Paliokaitė (2015), www.esparama.lt 
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ANNEX 4. DATA ON LITHUANIAN PARTICIPATION IN FP7/HORIZON 
2020 
 
According to European Commission data, by October, 2014, the number of Lithuanian applicants for FP7 
reached 2058 (MITA, 2015). 419 Lithuanian participants have signed 320 projects with a success rate of 
20% (EU28 average – 21.8%). These projects received 55.11 m euro contribution from EU. 28 projects were 
coordinated by Lithuanian participants. Comparing to FP6 Lithuanian applicants“ activity has increased but 
the success rate decreased. During FP6 1335 Lithuanian applicants signed 354 projects (success rate 22.2%). 
Also Lithuanian participants in FP7 received more funding from EC and coordinated more projects than in FP6 
(see Table 4.1). While comparing FP6 and FP7 results it should be noted that the structure of framework 
programmes and their goals differ.  For example, FP6 included special instruments aiming at involvement 
and better integration of the new EU Member States. Under FP7 Lithuania competes equally with other EU 
countries. 
The majority of Lithuanian participants in FP7 project are public R&D institutions. 88 SMEs are participating in 
FP7 projects with their contribution from EU of €17.56 m (32% of all EU contribution for Lithuanian 
participants). Among all organisations, SMEs are second to universities by their share of received EU funds. 
SMEs activity has increased significantly comparing to FP6. In FP6 31 SMEs projects received €3.15 m 
(11.7% of total EU contribution for Lithuanian participants). 
The top foreign collaborative links of Lithuanian participants has not changed and is the same both in FP6 
and FP7. It is United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France and Spain.  
Table 4.1. Comparison of FP7 and FP6. 
Source: European Commission, 2014 and MITA, 2015.  
Overall, compared to other EU countries Lithuania participation in FP7 looks weak. Lithuania is 24th by 
number of participants who signed contracts and 26th by budget share of EC contribution. Compared with the 
Baltic States Lithuania outscores Latvia by intensity of finance and participants activity but not in the 
indicator of success rate. However Lithuania is behind Estonia for all indicators.  
Table 4.2. Lithuania“s, Latvia“s and Estonia“s performance in FP7 
Country LT LV EE 
Number of participants 419 326 540 
Applications success rate 20% 21.6% 20.6% 
Total EU contribution, € m 55.11 48.19 88.64 
EU contribution per project participant, 
thousand € 
131.5 147.8 164,1 
Total number of SME participants, total 
EC financial contribution € million 
88 SMEs receiving 
€17.56m 
45 SMEs receiving € 5,32 
m 
179 SMEs receiving € 27,90 
m 
Source: EC data, July, 2014. 
 FP7 FP6 
Number of participants 419 354 
Number of applications 2058 1335 
Applications success rate 20% 22.2% 
Number of projects 320 275 
Total EU contribution, € m  55.11 26.9 
EU contribution per participant, €  thousand  131.5 76 
Number of coordinated projects 28 21 
EU contribution in coordinated projects, € m  55.11 6,9 
SME participants, % of total EU contribution  32% 11.7% 
Top collaborative links 1. UK - United Kingdom (539) 
2. DE - Germany (511) 
3. IT - Italy (419) 
4. FR - France (386) 
5. ES - Spain (364 
1. UK 
2. Germany 
3.Italy 
4.France 
5.Spain 
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While analysing fields where Lithuanian participants are most successful ICT, energy, health, 
Nanotechnologies, Materials and new Production Technologies and food and biotechnology (see figure 3 and 
4). It is expected that these themes will have a highest potential and perspective in Horizon 2020 
programme.  
Figure 4.1. Number of Lithuanian participants in FP7 
projects by thematic fields 
Figure 4.2. EC contribution to Lithuanian 
participants in FP7 projects by thematic fields 
  
Source: MITA data October, 2013. 
 
Lithuania Smart Specialisation strategy priorities almost match Horizon 2020 challenges (see table 4.3). 
Smart specialisation strategy could enable more strategic use of Horizon 2020 opportunities to support 
Lithuanian key economic priorities, by improving the engagement and supporting key sectors of economy and 
research fields. 
 
Table 4.3. Lithuania“s smart specialisation priorities and societal challenges addressed by 
Horizon 2020 
Horizon 2020 priorities LT smart specialisation priorities 
Health, demographic change and 
wellbeing 
Priority area „Health technologies and biotechnology“: 
 Molecular technologies for medicine and biopharmacy. 
 Intelligent applied technologies for personal and public health. 
 Advanced medical engineering for early diagnostics and treatment. 
Food security, sustainable 
agriculture and forestry, marine 
and maritime and inland water 
research, and the Bioeconomy 
Priority area „Agroinnovation and food technologies“: 
 Safer food. 
 Functional food. 
 Innovative development, improvement and processing of bioresources (biorefinery). 
Secure, clean and efficient 
energy 
Priority area „Energy and sustainable environment“: 
 Smart systems for generators, grids and users energy efficiency, diagnosis, monitoring, 
accounting and management. 
 Energy and fuel production from biomass or waste, storage and disposal of waste. 
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Horizon 2020 priorities LT smart specialisation priorities 
 Solar energy equipment and their use for power, heat and cool production. 
Smart, green and integrated 
transport 
Priority area „Transport, logistics and ICT“: 
 Intelligent transport systems and ICT. 
 Models/technologies for management of the international transport corridors and integration of 
different types of transport. 
Climate action, environment, 
resource efficiency and raw 
materials 
Priority area „Energy and sustainable environment“: 
 Smart low energy buildings development and maintenance technology – digital construction. 
Europe in a changing world - 
inclusive, innovative and 
reflective societies 
Priority area „Inclusive and creative society“: 
 Modern learning technologies and processes. 
 Technologies and processes for breakthrough innovations. 
Secure societies - protecting 
freedom and security of Europe 
and its citizens 
- 
 
 
 
 
Priority area „New processes, materials and technologies for industry“: 
 Photonic and laser technologies. 
 Functional materials and coatings. 
 Construction and composite materials. 
 Flexible technological systems for product design and manufacturing. 
Priority area „Transport, logistics and ICT“: 
 Technologies for developing advanced e-content and information interoperability. 
 Solutions and services for ICT infrastructure and cloud computing. 
Source: Paliokaitė (2015). 
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JRC Mission 
 
As the Commission’s  
in-house science service,  
the Joint Research Centre’s  
mission is to provide EU  
policies with independent,  
evidence-based scientific  
and technical support  
throughout the whole  
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Working in close  
cooperation with policy  
Directorates-General,  
the JRC addresses key  
societal challenges while  
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new methods, tools  
and standards, and sharing  
its know-how with  
the Member States,  
the scientific community  
and international partners. 
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